Edit: Disregard what I've wrote below. It isn't relevant since it assumes that the individual hasn't tried to make a Friendly AI which seems to be against the assumption in the hypothetical.
I'd be more interested in a response to the substance of my comment: If you think that a person is about to turn on a (to your way of thinking) insufficiently Friendly AI, such that killing them might stop the inevitable paperclipping of all you hold dear, how do you take into account the fact that they might have outwitted you by setting up a dead man's switch?
There seems to be a heavy overlap between people who think AGI will foom and people who are concerned about Friendliness (for somewhat obvious reasons. Friendliness matters a lot more if fooming is plausible). It seems extremely unlikely that someone would set up a dead man's switch unless they thought that a lot would actually get accomplished by the AI, i.e. that it would likely foom in a Friendly fashion. The actual chance that any such switches have been put into place seems low.
Oh, sure, I agree.
But what if Eliezer thinks he's got an FAI he can turn on, and Joe isn't convinced that it's actually as Friendly as Eliezer thinks it is? I'd rather Joe argue with Eliezer than shoot him.
It's probably easier to build an uncaring AI than a friendly one. So, if we assume that someone, somewhere is trying to build an AI without solving friendliness, that person will probably finish before someone who's trying to build a friendly AI.
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further edit:
Wow, this is getting a rather stronger reaction than I'd anticipated. Clarification: I'm not suggesting practical measures that should be implemented. Jeez. I'm deep in an armchair, thinking about a problem that (for the moment) looks very hypothetical.
For future reference, how should I have gone about asking this question without seeming like I want to mobilize the Turing Police?