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lukeprog comments on A Defense of Naive Metaethics - Less Wrong Discussion
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Comments (294)
Clearly, you can make statements about things that don't exist. People do it all the time, and I don't object to it. I enjoy works of fiction, too. But if the aim of our dialogue is true claims about reality, then you've got to talk about things that exist - whether the subject matter is 'oughts' or not.
I don't see why this needs to be the case. I can stipulate short meanings of 'should' as I use the term. People do this all the time (implicitly, at least) when using hypothetical imperatives.
Also, in general I find myself confused by your way of talking about these things. It's not a language I'm familiar with, so I suspect I'm still not fully understanding you. I'm not sure which of our anticipations differ because of the disagreement you're trying to express.
Which would mean either that mathematical knowledge is false, or that there is a Platonic word of mathematical objects for it to correspond to.
OTOH, one could just adopt the Dogma of Empiricism that there is analytical truth which is neither 'about' physical realitty nor 'about' about any metaphysical one ( and that mathematical truth is anayltical). (and that mathematical truth is anayltical).
And if it is an analytical truth that, for instance, that you should do as you would be done by, then that is still applicable to real world situations by fulling "as you would be done by" for your own case.
But the aim of our dialogue isn't really true claims. It's useful claims - claims that one can incorporate into one's decision-making process. Claims about Darth Vader, you can't, but claims about ought, you can.
What about that other word (that is also spelled "should") that you don't have to stipulate the meaning of because people already know what it means?
What about the regular kind of imperatives?
If I define "fa" to mean "any object which more than 75% of the claims in this long book of no previous importance accurately describes", I have done something very strange, even if I letter say "If 'fa' means 'red', that's fa."
I don't understand what you mean, here. I'm not sure what you mean by 'true' or 'useful', I guess. I'm talking about true claims in this sense.
Which one is that, and what does everybody already know it to mean?
I mean what you mean by "true", or maybe something very similar.
By "useful" I mean "those claims that could help someone come to a decision about their actions"
It's what people say when they say "should" but don't precede it with "if". Some people on lesswrong think it means:
[you should do X] = [X maximizes this complicated function that can be computed from my brain state]
Some think it means:
[you should do X] = [X maximizes whatever complicated function is computed from my brain state]
and I think:
[you should do X] = [the statement that, if believed, would cause one to do X]
or rather [you should do X] = [the statement that, if believed, would cause one to do X if one were an ideal and completely non akrasic agent]
Correct.
You can find that there is a bug in your brain that causes you to react to a certain belief, but you'd fix it if you notice it's there, since you don't think that belief should cause that action.
I could say
[the statement that, if believed by a rational agent, would cause it to do X]
but that's circular.
But one of the points I've been trying to make is that it's okay for the definition of something to be, in some sense, circular. As long as you can describe the code for a rational agent that manipulates that kind of statement.
All definitions should be circular. "The president is the Head of State" is a correct definition. "The president is Obama" is true, but not a definition.
Non-circular definitions can certainly be perfectly fine:
"A bachelor is an unmarried man.'
This style is used in math to define new concepts to simplify communication and thought.
"A bachelor is an unmarried man.'
If that is non circular, so is [the statement that, if believed by a rational agent, would cause it to do X]
I'm quite confused. By circular do you mean anaylitcal, or recursive? (example of the latter: a setis something that can contain elemetns or other sets)
I'm not sure what I mean.
The definition I am using is in the following category:
It may appear problematically self-referential, but it is in fact self-referential in a non-problematic manner.
Agreed?
Some things you can't define exactly, only refer to them with some measure of accuracy. Physical facts are like this. Morality is like this. Rational agents don't define morality, they respond to it, they are imperfect detectors of moral facts who would use their moral expertise to improve own ability to detect moral facts or build other tools capable of that. There is nothing circular here, just constant aspiration for referencing the unreachable ideal through changeable means.
But there aren't causal arrows pointing from morality to rational agents, are there? Just acausal/timeless arrows.
You do have to define "morality" as meaning "that thing that we're trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy", whereas "red" is not defined to refer to the same thing.
If you agree, I think we're on the same page.
I think the idea of acausal/logical control captures what causality was meant to capture in more detail, and is a proper generalization of it. So I'd say that there are indeed "causal" arrows from morality to decisions of agents, to the extent the idea of "causal" dependence is used correctly and not restricted to the way we define physical laws on a certain level of detail.
Why would I define it so? It's indeed what we are trying to refer to, but what it is exactly we cannot know.
Lost me here. We know enough about morality to say that it's not the same thing as "red", yes.
Sure.
Let me rephrase a bit.
"That thing, over there (which we're trying to refer to with some measure of accuracy), point point".
I'm defining it extensionally, except for the fact that it doesn't physically exist.
There has to be some kind of definition or else we wouldn't know what we were talking about, even if it's extensional and hard to put into words.
"red" and "right" have different extensional definitions.