Favorable? I don't know why you'd think that. Seems to me the charitable interpretation of Hanson's view has him thinking of ems as naturally Friendly, or near-Friendly
You would have to tell me what friendly and unfriendly means in this context. Hanson expects ems to be very numerous and very poor. I doubt he expects any one of them to have the resources available to what's usually called an fai. Is a human being running at human speeds F or UF?
If we somehow get trillions of uFAIs with practically different goals, then of course the expected value of killing humanity goes way down. But it still sounds greater than the expected value of cooperating with us, by Hanson's analysis.
I don't think the notion of "cooperating with us" is coherent. Just as the trillions of ems might have practically different goals, so might the billions of live humans.
I also don't understand how you get that much memory and processing power without some designer that seems awfully close to an AI-programming AI.
Possibly, being poor, they would not have that much memory and processing power.
Taking the last part first for context: this layman thinks that just simulating a conscious brain (experiencing something other than pure terror or slow insanity) would take a lot of resources using the copy-an-airplane-with-bullet-holes approach where you don't know what the parts actually do, at least not well enough to make a self-reflective programming AI from scratch.
As to the rest, I'm assuming my previous claims hold for the case of a single AGI because you seemed to argue that simply introducing a lot more AGIs changes the argument. ("Cooperat...
Link: overcomingbias.com/2011/07/debating-yudkowsky.html