If this is true, it has an interesting application: you could control the utility weight of a simulation nearly independently from it's behaviour, by having it deterministic except for a large input for random data in it, and switching the sourced of that randomness between a pseudorandom number algorithm and quantum randomness. Obvious example would be an upload of you which is deterministic and non-branching when experiencing unpleasant things, and massively branching (much more so than your biological brain) when experiencing pleasant things.
I've written a prior post about how I think that the Everett branching factor of reality dominates that of any plausible simulation, whether the latter is run on a Von Neumann machine, on a quantum machine, or on some hybrid; and thus the probability and utility weight that should be assigned to simulations in general is negligible. I also argued that the fact that we live in an apparently quantum-branching world could be construed as weak anthropic evidence for this idea. My prior post was down-modded into oblivion for reasons that are not relevant here (style, etc.) If I were to replace this text you're reading with a version of that idea which was more fully-argued, but still stylistically-neutral (unlike my prior post), would people be interested?