For fiction: How could alien minds differ from human minds?
One of the most important points raised by the sequences is that not all minds are like humans. In quite a few places, people have discussed minds with slight changes from human minds, which seem altogether different. However, a lot of this discussion has been related to AI, as opposed to minds created by evolution. I'm trying to think of ways that minds which evolved, and are effective enough to start a civilization, could differ from humans'.
Three Worlds Collide would seem like an excellent starting point, but isn't actually very useful. As far as I recall, the Babyeaters might have learned their baby eating habits as a result of societal pressure. The main difference in their society seemed to be the assumption that people who disagreed with you were simply mistaken: this contrasts to humans' tendency to form rival groups, and assume everyone in the rival groups is evil. The Super-Happies had self modified, and so don't provide an example of an evolved mind.
So here are my ideas so far.
- A species could have the same neural pathways for wanting and liking. This would lead to far less akrasia.
- A species could have a different set of standards for boredom. This seems to be one of the most precarious values in the human mind.
Loading…
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Comments (68)
Robert Freitas' Xenopsychology article has some interesting speculation around this theme. I recommend reading the whole thing, but here are some excerpts to get you interested:
Ganglionic intelligence:
Alien cultural universals:
Alien emotions:
... and more.
The ganglionic intelligence reminds me somewhat of Watts' Thing (link to his short story)
I'll give it a few shots...
Based off of something I once saw about octopuses, how about a creature with no sense continuity of self? Or no sense of self at all, even?
Or there's several ways to look at a creature that is largely immortal. I'm thinking of two specifically: One is so hearty that they can hardly suffer damage or death no matter what. The other is generally long-lived, but largely because they are careful (I think Eliezer talked about this somewhere, but I can't find it) that they would be terrified of crossing a street or driving a car because even a 1 in 100 million chance of death is too dangerous (but they would expect to get a royal flush several times over the course of their lives, they live that long).
I like the idea for wanting/liking being the same thing. You could play off of that theme with stuff like: - creatures who have conscious control over their reward circuitry - creatures whose neural reward pathways grow with age, so they experience rewards more deeply the older they get - creatures whose pathways for liking are transmitted to others, so the more creatures that like something, the deeper the pleasure - creatures whose desires can be traded
That's about all I could come up with in the past ~20 minutes. Hope they help.
The nearly immortal and very careful species is a trope that shows up in some science fiction stories. See for example the Puppeteers in Niven's Ringworld. Note also that there's some empirical evidence for this on a small scale. Countries which have longer lifespans generally have more risk averse populations. There's an argument that dueling went out of style in many cultures about the same time that the likelyhood to die from a lot of diseases went down as well. I don't know if the data really reflects that claim though.
There are the aliens in Blindsight. Rot13 Spoiler: Jub ner rkgerzryl vagryyvtrag ohg ynpx pbafpvbhfarff.
Speaking of Blindsight, Watts drew heavily on Metzinger's Being No One. One of my favorite Watts blog posts was his post on the PRISM model of consciousness http://www.rifters.com/crawl/?p=791 and to quote from the PRISM guy:
I'd guess because pain has to be immediate to be of value, so the more processing you heap on it the less useful it becomes; and species tend to evolve pain before they evolve utility-judging systems.
Awesome link!
I'm not quite sure if I think that the PRISM theory is particularly accurate though. There are plenty of animals that can mediate between conflicting impulses, which don't seem very conscious. Like cows, or frogs. It seems plausible that people may have already built robots that do this.
I'm fairly capable of imagining living in my body while everything below my neck exhibits goal-oriented behavior without my input. I think I would still be conscious in that state.
So I don't really think that consciousness is the phenomena of mediating between conflicted motor impulses.
I'm with Kaj on this. One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens. I don't mind counting frogs or cows as partially conscious to the extent they reconcile conflicting impulses, and I don't understand why you take such a viewpoint as a refutation of PRISM. Why is consciousness all-or-nothing, rather than a matter of degrees?
It's definitely a matter of degree, but I don't think that humans being more conscious is a result of being more able to reconcile conflicting impulses. I think of the refutation as more being in my second paragraph.
Imagine if a friend of yours suddenly somehow lost all control of their body except for their mouth. They do things, and have introspective access to why, and can talk about what they're doing, but take no part in actually deciding what to do.
I would still consider them to be conscious, and intuitively think that something that is more able to talk about itself is more conscious, more so than I think that being able to decide makes something conscious.
Human consciousness can mediate internal conflicts, but I don't think that internal conflict mediation is a sufficient condition for consciousness.
The degree vs kind distinction still works for that. You're just proposing a slippery slope and denying the first step is downward. Keep taking your friend and chopping away capabilities (more capabilities means more possibilities means more potential for conflict) - chop away their long-term memory, short-term memory, random senses, etc.
Where do you say they begin to lose some consciousness? I'm happy to say that they lose a little bit every time, with some losses being reparable over time and the exact loss.
(And I wonder how conscious your friend would actually be. Certainly, there's a lot of potential there, but judging from float tanks and the psychological effects of isolation tanks...)
(Notes confusion)
Intuitively, I think they stop being conscious when they stop being able to talk to me about what they subjectively think about the world.
Not being able to control your body makes you a bit less conscious, but not nearly as much as removing long term memory. I don't think that the degree of conflict is as important as the degree of representation.
Confusion on "subjectively think":
I think that this is a proxy for having an experience of the world, qualia and that sort of thing.
Confusion on being "able to talk":
I can have an inner dialogue without opening my mouth and vocalizing to other people, and I still report consciousness. If I had magical telepathy powers that let me access someone's inner dialogue without them talking, then they would probably be able to convince me of their consciousness.
Those are really just the ideas that I'm using to think about this. Since they seem really important to what I personally mean when I say consciousness, I don't think its the ability to mediate internal conflicts.
I feel like the losing consciousness is probably a result of losing sensory input on which to base a model of the world. When your world model is gone, its harder to talk about things.
You only have as many qualia as you need to; sensory data is discarded as much as possible. (Look at meditation, how much one experiences but does not notice. Look at dreams - they seem vivid and real, until one tries to see specific detail like reading written material.) And what one perceives is strongly shaped by what one expects (eg. the ba-ga experiment or the entire prediction-is-intelligence line of thought - On Intelligence comes to mind). Look at how the mind shuts down when there is little to do, in things like highway hypnosis.
(Maybe you should read the PRISM papers.)
Upon reading the papers, it seems like were talking about different things.
I was talking about what I thought consciousness was (like, what I would label as conscious and unconscious), and I think you were talking about what it does/is for.
Is there a difference between what something is and what something does?
What makes you think that? I'm not entirely sure of frogs, but cows seem obviously conscious to me.
I've got to agree, Blindsight is an excellent example. It successfully (IMHO) portrays aliens that are clearly quite intelligent, and yet utterly inhuman.
* SPOILERS SPOILERS *
The most frightening thing about them is that none of the usual tropes apply to them; mutual understanding and/or empathy isn't an option because their psychology (or possibly lack thereof) makes it completely impossible. There's nothing there to empathize with.
I think you meant Rot13.
Yes. The two keys are right next to each other on my keyboard :-)
An interesting exercise would be to try to imagine a society of humans whose minds operated the way most intellectuals today imagine human minds operate.
For instance, see the recent post by LukeProg on values being relative. What would people be like if they really did have states as terminal values, the way folk psychology says they do?
Another exercise is: What would society be like if everyone knew how their minds operated? How would we act if people didn't believe in free will? (Asking that question gives me a headache... it seems to imply that we have free will.) How would we act if we were rational utility-maximizers?
Look into eusocial animals, e.g. ants, bees, wasps, termites, and naked mole rats. Intelligent minds of similar evolutionary origin would be very different from ours.
That depends on whether they're intelligent on an individual or a hive level. After all, we are in a sense eusocial collections of cells.
Relative rate of thinking. The universe may appear to be very different to very fast or slow thinkers relative to humans.
Also, relative rate of return on investment, and relative lifespan.
Tweak the bandwidth of information exchange and see what you get. With weaker communication powers, you get most nonhuman social animals on Earth, from ants to wolves to prairie dogs: able to exchange meaningful information ("food here"; "predator there") but not to express abstractions. How about with higher-bandwidth or more powerful information exchange? Suppose that I could, in the space of a few seconds of speech, convey not merely a fact, but the equivalent of paragraphs of information as to how I knew that fact?
(Or, of course, I could lie. Is increased bandwidth really all that useful? If so, why don't we have it?)
Alternately:
Some have suggested that a human mind is a sort of symbiote between genetic replicators (the human body including brain) and memetic replicators (culture, language, social behaviors, ideas). Certain aspects of human behavior are relatively constant across cultures, while others are highly variable. For instance, there are many different languages, but they all fit certain common patterns, because they have to be learned by a human brain.
Suppose that the relative strength of cultural-memetic replicators is increased: a species in which any given biological individual can be expected to participate not only in several different cultural milieux over the course of its life, but where a process somewhere between religious conversion and career-change takes the significance that reproduction has for humans. Converting other adults to follow your religion/worldview/profession/habits/hobbies/quirks strongly dominates reproduction and child-care as demands on organisms' energy. Rather than a reproductively successful individual being one who has several children, and a "loser" being someone who cannot find a mate, a successful person of this species is expected to have several followers or students in different aspects of life, and a "loser" is someone who is not imitated by anyone in any regard.
Ah, that's a very intruiging question - to which we probably won't get any better answer that what we can come up with through speculation...
It's really, really hard to extrapolate from n=1 intelligent species, but as you suggest, there may be some universals; some things I would consider in coming up with a credible alien intelligence:
Then there's the fact that certain traits may make it much more likely to encounter aliens that have them - if they don't have the need or curiosity to go beyond their home ground, it's much less likely you would encounter them.
I feel however that it is really hard to think about so very different minds. While I don't subscribe to his non-reductionist views of the mind, Thomas Nagel's What is it like to be a bat? is a classic in this area, as it's reprinted in The Mind's I.
Anyway, good luck writing your fiction!
Spread of your genes is what's optimized for by evolution - all of our values are conditional on the reality of how we live and spread our genes. Hive creature? Different values. Solitary creature? Different values. Underwater? Values. Cannibalistic? Eating babies is an important value, it's unwise to make the relativistic claim that it's just "social" - that's a slippery slope to societies with no babyeating at all.
In this post Robin Hanson presents a plausible vaguely anthropic argument that alien psychology (as well as physiology) may be more like human then you'd expect.
It's hard to imagine something stranger than things that already exist, like eusocial insects, slime molds, solitary mammals, total winner-take-all reproduction, parasites, or species that don't care for or recognize their young.
Ooh, I love this kind of thing! (i also consider myself very good at it) However, I can't really communicate somehting as complex as the kind of idea that makes a non gimmicky, truly alien mind through static text, mainly because I suck at explaining things that way. And I am confident the results will be much better if it us customized to the story anyway. So, I suggest we meet up over IM for a brainstorm session. As I said, I love this kind of stuff and will do it just for fun without you needing to mention me in the credits or anything like that if you don't want to.
A species that evolved intelligence but for which the social brain hypothesis is false might be very different-- but I don't know if it is plausible that such a species would develop a civilization.
Do you mean what Eliezer calls the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis? (That is, human intelligence evolved via runaway sexual selection--people who were politically competent were more reproductively successful, and as people got better and better at the game of politics, so too did the game get harder and harder, hence the feedback loop.)
Perhaps a species could evolve intelligence without such a mechanism, if something about their environment is just dramatically more complex in a peculiar way compared with ours, so that intelligence was worthwhile just for non-social purposes. The species' ancestors may have been large predators on top of the food chain, where members are typically solitary and territorial and hunt over a large region of land, with its ecosystem strangely different from ours in some way that I'm not specifying (but you'd need a pretty clever idea about it to make this whole thing work).
These aliens wouldn't be inherently social the way humans are, but they wouldn't be antisocial either--they would have noticed that cooperation allows them to solve even more difficult problems and get even more from their environment. (Still in a pre-technological stage. Remember, something about this environment is such that it provides a nearly smooth, practically unbounded (in difficulty) array of puzzles/problems to solve with increasing rewards.) Eventually, they may build a civilization just to more efficiently organize to obtain these benefits, which will also allow them to advance technologically. (I'm probably drawing too sharp of a distinction between technological advancement and interaction with their strangely complex environment.)
They might lack the following trait that is very central to human nature: affection through familiarity. When we spend a lot of time with a person/thing/activity/idea, we grow fond of it. They might not have this, or they might not have it in such generality (e.g. they might still have it for, say, mates, if they reproduce sexually). They might also be a lot less biased than we are by social considerations, for the obvious reason, but perhaps they have less raw cognitive horsepower (their environment being no substitute for the human pastimes of politics and sex).
Recklessly speculative, obviously, but I gather that's all we can hope to offer to Solvent.
We might imagine a predator who hunts prey who are developing intelligence via the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, but lacks precision manipulaton abilities so are unable to do much more than hide and run in increasingly clever ways (perhaps they are snake-like) and thus their predators must evolve to be smart enough to trick or trap them before eventually breaking through into tool use and eventually building some kind of civilization. Such a creature might view all social interaction as competative; imagine trying to have a discussion with somebody who is biologically driven to try and trick, betray or decieve you with every action.
My impression is that convergent evolution is commonplace. Boredom or equivalent algorithms are necessary for any complex learning. Emotions are molded by game theory. Once you have an intelligent social animal the selection pressures relentlessly shape the mind. If I met an alien I wouldn't be surprised if he or she was almost exactly like me in a lot of ways, to the extent that he or she would describe similar drug experiences and have similar archetypes in his or her fiction. In their vast diversity humans vary about as much as biological minds can vary. Think of it as a challenge: I'd be very interested in alien minds that clearly took these considerations into account but still ended up truly bizarre.
On the other hand, the aliens could (for example) have emotions encoding a different game-theoretic strategy, or a different prior over what games it's going to have to play.
For example, boredom is useful in a hunter gatherer, but in an ambush predator it would be counter-productive as their optimum strategy might be remaining in the same place for long periods.
Do felines not experience boredom?
Interesting question. They enjoy playing, but they also enjoy lying in one place for hours at a time.
Is boredom with an activity different from not enjoying the activity? Are zombies bored? I would say they are not.
Zombies are fake.
Can you be more precise about your reasons? I'm sure they're in the linking articles somewhere but there's a bit too much there for me to comprehend.
Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that there were already existent strong arguments for that; it's just my personal speculation. I think it's one of those things where I could type for a few days straight and still not accurately describe my intuitions and their origins. Better to just read a ton of vaguely relevant stuff, I think.
How about:
Lots of fun possibilities in this area.
Humans do this (and increasingly so). e.g. we have physicists, mathematicians, economists, psychologists etc.
Perhaps one might imagine a creature that essentially cultivates multiple personalities disorder for each task they perform, where the task at hand is (more or less) their utility function, unless something like survival instict kicked in an override?
Imagine a creature that didn't do that!
You have read A Fire Upon The Deep, right?
Alternately, imagine being able to explicitly fork and merge streams of cognition as easily and explicitly as one can fork code in git. You could imagine each stream gets its own set of permissions, so the left hand might really not know what the right tentacle is doing.
Humans (roughly) desire to be happy. Imagine aliens who desire to be angry instead.
Isn't it the act of desiring that makes it happiness, not the name?
Only sort of.
While we are happy we have certain mental dispositions which are unrelated to the ones we desire when we desire happiness. Happy people are more likely to give to charity. Happy people (or at least people on certain antidepressants) are also more likely to judge harming others as wrong -- whether this translates into less actual harm, I don't know. Further, people tend to prefer that others be happy -- that's why people are always telling depressed people to smile.
Imagine that in these aliens, happiness worked in terms of its behavioral effects as it does in humans, as did anger. But aliens might still want themselves to be angry even as they want others to be happy.
Yes, but also smiling makes people happier. So it is pretty good advice for depressed people.
By this you mean that when these aliens get what they want, instead of feeling content and magnanimous, they feel discontent and destructive? Don't you see how that could be an evolutionary handicap?
I'm not sure anger necessarily leads to discontent. If you want to get mad as hell and break things, you might feel better after doing so if you've been stifling a lot of discontent up to then. I don't really pretend to know what's going on in the head of a rioter but this seems possible.
I don't mean that actions anger predisposes you toward leave you discontented, I mean that part of the physiological emotion of anger is discontentment.
Yeah, I guess it could be a handicap. But then human brains have so many bizarre flaws and spandrels that I think we could get away with swapping a few of ours for this one.
An alien species might be very adaptive, able to learn new things exclusively - and efficiently - by media such as audio, video, and text. Such a species might not have its culture organized around the seizing of others and agglomerating their brains and the defense from likewise. Prictualcre to determine who eats from whom, and how much brain to take, and how much work must be put into studying directly from books, and concomitant social enforcement mechanisms regulating such might be entirely absent. At first glance, that seems like a lot, though not everything that makes us who we are, but a bit of thought will reveal how deeply prictualcre is embedded in not just our culture but our biology, and in fact a species without it would be almost unimaginably strange. We simply don't notice it because of its universality on biological, cultural, and other levels.
I wonder what, if any, the relationship is between several things: predicting what humans will learn about the laws of nature, and predicting what alien life is likely to be like, for both an estimate and confidence in it.
It feels incongruous that I am relatively agnostic and uncertain about alien life's form (assuming it exists) but somewhat confident physics is close to hitting bedrock within the century.
I could just be ill-informed and reasoning poorly. Even so, I would expect patterns to those shortcomings.