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For fiction: How could alien minds differ from human minds?

9 Post author: Solvent 21 August 2011 10:37AM

One of the most important points raised by the sequences is that not all minds are like humans. In quite a few places, people have discussed minds with slight changes from human minds, which seem altogether different. However, a lot of this discussion has been related to AI, as opposed to minds created by evolution. I'm trying to think of ways that minds which evolved, and are effective enough to start a civilization, could differ from humans'.

Three Worlds Collide would seem like an excellent starting point, but isn't actually very useful. As far as I recall, the Babyeaters might have learned their baby eating habits as a result of societal pressure. The main difference in their society seemed to be the assumption that people who disagreed with you were simply mistaken: this contrasts to humans' tendency to form rival groups, and assume everyone in the rival groups is evil. The Super-Happies had self modified, and so don't provide an example of an evolved mind.

So here are my ideas so far.

  • A species could have the same neural pathways for wanting and liking. This would lead to far less akrasia.
  • A species could have a different set of standards for boredom. This seems to be one of the most precarious values in the human mind.
What other ways can you think of?

Comments (68)

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 21 August 2011 06:23:27PM *  26 points [-]

Robert Freitas' Xenopsychology article has some interesting speculation around this theme. I recommend reading the whole thing, but here are some excerpts to get you interested:

Ganglionic intelligence:

On Earth, evolution favored voted the appearance of intelligence in two major classes of animal nervous systems, called ganglionic and chordate. It has its own peculiar psychology.

The invertebrates, representing perhaps 97% of all animal species alive today, took the ganglionic intelligence option. The earthworm is typical. Each of its many segments is almost an individual organism unto itself, having its own set of kidneys, muscles, sensors and so forth. Coordination is achieved by a thin latticework of nerve fibers crisscrossing from side to side and lengthwise. The ganglionic system resembles a ladder with bulbous neural tissues at the joints. Invertebrate organisms thus are comprised of a collection of sub-brains, each of which controls a separate part of the animal with fairly complete autonomy and no real centralized control. Sensors and their ganglia tend to cluster nearer the head, making not a true brain as we understand the term but rather a large bundle of distinct fibers. Such a nervous system is highly efficient for responding quickly to stimuli. Each clump of nerve cells becomes expert at some particular function–detecting and passing along sensory information, sweeping a leg or swing in wide uniform arc, opening and closing the jaws in slow munching motions during feeding, and so on.

Might extraterrestrials develop a high ganglionic intelligence that has, never developed on Earth despite hundreds of millions of years of opportunity? [...] It is hard for us to imagine the mentality of beings with advanced ganglionic intelligence. Dr. H. Chandler Elliot, a neurologist at the University of Nebraska College of Medicine, notes that humans normally disregard their internal organs. We respond to an empty stomach or a feeling of indigestion but normally we ignore its activities. Says Elliot: "The head of an insect apparently regards not only its viscera but also its legs, wings, and so on, with similar detachment. If one deftly clips off the abdomen of a feeding wasp, the head may go on sucking, obviously not distressed. The mind of such a creature, must be alien to us almost beyond comprehension." [...]

Yet another possibility is alien minds incorporating the advantages of both ganglionic and chordate architectures. For instance, each invertebrate sub-brain might evolve and enlarge to avoid multiplication of internal interconnections. This development is most likely in a radially symmetrical sea creature, wherein each brain has roughly equal access to sensory input and motor controls. Such creatures would have "collegial" mentalities, something akin to the many voting computers aboard the Space Shuttle, with multiple personalities within each organism and the ability to maintain consciousness under extreme physical trauma so long as any one brain remained functional.

Alien cultural universals:

To illustrate his point, he first refers to an inventory of the elements of human nature compiled by the American anthropologist George P. Murdock during a study of cultural universals:

Age-grading, athletic sports, bodily adornment, calendar, cleanliness training, community organizations, cooking, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, dancing, decorative art. divination, division of labor, dream interpretation, education, eschatology, ethics, ethnobotany, etiquette, faith healing. family feasting, firemaking, folklore, food taboos, funeral rites, games, gestures, gift giving, government, greetings, hairstyles, hospitality, housing, hygiene, incest taboos, inheritance rules, joking, kin groups, kinship nomenclature, language, law, luck superstitions, magic,. marriage, mealtimes, medicine, obstetrics, penal sanctions, personal names, population policy, postnatal care, pregnancy usages, property rights, propitiation of supernatural beings, puberty customs, religious rituals, residence rules, sexual restrictions, soul concepts, status differentiation, surgery, toolmaking, trade, visiting, weaving, and weather control.

Wilson insists that few if any of these elements are inevitable outcomes of either high intelligence or advanced social life; rather that "human nature is just one hodgepodge out of many conceivable." An entomologist by training, he has no trouble imagining an alien insectlike society whose members am even more intelligent and complexly organized than people, yet which lacks many of the qualities listed in Murdock's inventory. The alien inventory:

Age-grading, antennal rites, body licking, calendar, cannibalism, caste determinism, caste laws, colony-foundation rules, colony organization, cleanliness training, communal nurseries, cooperative labor, cosmology, courtship, division of labor, drone control, education, eschatology, ethics, etiquette, euthanasia, firemaking, food taboos, gift-giving, government, greetings, grooming rituals, hospitality, hosing, hygiene, incest taboos, language, larval care, law, medicine, metamorphosis rites, mutual regurgitation, nursing castes, nuptial flights, nutrient eggs, population policy, queen obeisance, residence rules, sex determination, solder castes, sisterhoods, status differentiation, sterile workers, surgery, symbiont care, toolmaking, trade, visiting, weather control . . . and still other activities so alien as to make mere description by our language difficult.

Alien emotions:

Of course, extraterrestrial sentients may possess physiological states corresponding to limbic-like emotions that have no direct analog in human experience. Alien species, having evolved under a different set of environmental constraints than we, also could have a different but equally adaptive emotional repertoire. For example, assume that human observers land on another and discover an intelligent animal with an acute sense of absolute humidity and absolute air pressure. For this creature, there may exist an emotional state responding to an unfavorable change in the weather. Physiologically, the emotion could be mediated by the ET equivalent of the human limbic system; it might arise following the secretion of certain strength-enhancing and libido-arousing hormones into the alien's bloodstream in response to the perceived change in weather. Immediately our creature begins to engage in a variety of learned and socially-approved behaviors, including furious burrowing and building, smearing tree sap over its pelt, several different territorial defense ceremonies, and vigorous polygamous copulations with nearby females, apparently (to humans) for no reason at all. Would our astronauts interpret this as madness? Or love? Lust? Fear? Anger? None of these is correct, of course the alien is feeling badweather.

... and more.

Comment author: Eneasz 23 August 2011 08:55:35PM -1 points [-]

The ganglionic intelligence reminds me somewhat of Watts' Thing (link to his short story)

Comment author: beriukay 21 August 2011 01:56:05PM 10 points [-]

I'll give it a few shots...

Based off of something I once saw about octopuses, how about a creature with no sense continuity of self? Or no sense of self at all, even?

Or there's several ways to look at a creature that is largely immortal. I'm thinking of two specifically: One is so hearty that they can hardly suffer damage or death no matter what. The other is generally long-lived, but largely because they are careful (I think Eliezer talked about this somewhere, but I can't find it) that they would be terrified of crossing a street or driving a car because even a 1 in 100 million chance of death is too dangerous (but they would expect to get a royal flush several times over the course of their lives, they live that long).

I like the idea for wanting/liking being the same thing. You could play off of that theme with stuff like: - creatures who have conscious control over their reward circuitry - creatures whose neural reward pathways grow with age, so they experience rewards more deeply the older they get - creatures whose pathways for liking are transmitted to others, so the more creatures that like something, the deeper the pleasure - creatures whose desires can be traded

That's about all I could come up with in the past ~20 minutes. Hope they help.

Comment author: JoshuaZ 23 August 2011 12:57:35AM 4 points [-]

The nearly immortal and very careful species is a trope that shows up in some science fiction stories. See for example the Puppeteers in Niven's Ringworld. Note also that there's some empirical evidence for this on a small scale. Countries which have longer lifespans generally have more risk averse populations. There's an argument that dueling went out of style in many cultures about the same time that the likelyhood to die from a lot of diseases went down as well. I don't know if the data really reflects that claim though.

Comment author: Jack 21 August 2011 02:40:27PM *  8 points [-]

There are the aliens in Blindsight. Rot13 Spoiler: Jub ner rkgerzryl vagryyvtrag ohg ynpx pbafpvbhfarff.

Comment author: gwern 21 August 2011 05:59:50PM 7 points [-]

Speaking of Blindsight, Watts drew heavily on Metzinger's Being No One. One of my favorite Watts blog posts was his post on the PRISM model of consciousness http://www.rifters.com/crawl/?p=791 and to quote from the PRISM guy:

“…One could imagine a conscious nervous system that operates as humans do but does not suffer any internal strife. In such a system, knowledge guiding skeletomotor action would be isomorphic to, and never at odds with, the nature of the phenomenal state — running across the hot desert sand in order to reach water would actually feel good, because performing the action is deemed adaptive. Why our nervous system does not operate with such harmony is perhaps a question that only evolutionary biology can answer. Certainly one can imagine such integration occurring without anything like phenomenal states, but from the present standpoint, this reflects more one’s powers of imagination than what has occurred in the course of evolutionary history.”

Comment author: FeepingCreature 21 August 2011 07:36:41PM 6 points [-]

I'd guess because pain has to be immediate to be of value, so the more processing you heap on it the less useful it becomes; and species tend to evolve pain before they evolve utility-judging systems.

Comment author: atucker 22 August 2011 05:10:00AM *  0 points [-]

Awesome link!

I'm not quite sure if I think that the PRISM theory is particularly accurate though. There are plenty of animals that can mediate between conflicting impulses, which don't seem very conscious. Like cows, or frogs. It seems plausible that people may have already built robots that do this.

I'm fairly capable of imagining living in my body while everything below my neck exhibits goal-oriented behavior without my input. I think I would still be conscious in that state.

So I don't really think that consciousness is the phenomena of mediating between conflicted motor impulses.

Comment author: gwern 22 August 2011 02:10:43PM 2 points [-]

I'm with Kaj on this. One man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens. I don't mind counting frogs or cows as partially conscious to the extent they reconcile conflicting impulses, and I don't understand why you take such a viewpoint as a refutation of PRISM. Why is consciousness all-or-nothing, rather than a matter of degrees?

Comment author: atucker 22 August 2011 02:26:19PM *  1 point [-]

It's definitely a matter of degree, but I don't think that humans being more conscious is a result of being more able to reconcile conflicting impulses. I think of the refutation as more being in my second paragraph.

Imagine if a friend of yours suddenly somehow lost all control of their body except for their mouth. They do things, and have introspective access to why, and can talk about what they're doing, but take no part in actually deciding what to do.

I would still consider them to be conscious, and intuitively think that something that is more able to talk about itself is more conscious, more so than I think that being able to decide makes something conscious.

Human consciousness can mediate internal conflicts, but I don't think that internal conflict mediation is a sufficient condition for consciousness.

Comment author: gwern 22 August 2011 03:07:51PM 1 point [-]

Imagine if a friend of yours suddenly somehow lost all control of their body except for their mouth. They do things, and have introspective access to why, and can talk about what they're doing, but take no part in actually deciding what to do. I would still consider them to be conscious, and intuitively think that something that is more able to talk about itself is more conscious, more so than I think that being able to decide makes something conscious.

The degree vs kind distinction still works for that. You're just proposing a slippery slope and denying the first step is downward. Keep taking your friend and chopping away capabilities (more capabilities means more possibilities means more potential for conflict) - chop away their long-term memory, short-term memory, random senses, etc.

Where do you say they begin to lose some consciousness? I'm happy to say that they lose a little bit every time, with some losses being reparable over time and the exact loss.

(And I wonder how conscious your friend would actually be. Certainly, there's a lot of potential there, but judging from float tanks and the psychological effects of isolation tanks...)

Comment author: atucker 22 August 2011 03:17:37PM *  0 points [-]

(Notes confusion)

Intuitively, I think they stop being conscious when they stop being able to talk to me about what they subjectively think about the world.

Not being able to control your body makes you a bit less conscious, but not nearly as much as removing long term memory. I don't think that the degree of conflict is as important as the degree of representation.

Confusion on "subjectively think":

I think that this is a proxy for having an experience of the world, qualia and that sort of thing.

Confusion on being "able to talk":

I can have an inner dialogue without opening my mouth and vocalizing to other people, and I still report consciousness. If I had magical telepathy powers that let me access someone's inner dialogue without them talking, then they would probably be able to convince me of their consciousness.

Those are really just the ideas that I'm using to think about this. Since they seem really important to what I personally mean when I say consciousness, I don't think its the ability to mediate internal conflicts.

(And I wonder how conscious your friend would actually be. Certainly, there's a lot of potential there, but judging from float tanks and the psychological effects of isolation tanks...)

I feel like the losing consciousness is probably a result of losing sensory input on which to base a model of the world. When your world model is gone, its harder to talk about things.

Comment author: gwern 22 August 2011 03:38:56PM 2 points [-]

You only have as many qualia as you need to; sensory data is discarded as much as possible. (Look at meditation, how much one experiences but does not notice. Look at dreams - they seem vivid and real, until one tries to see specific detail like reading written material.) And what one perceives is strongly shaped by what one expects (eg. the ba-ga experiment or the entire prediction-is-intelligence line of thought - On Intelligence comes to mind). Look at how the mind shuts down when there is little to do, in things like highway hypnosis.

(Maybe you should read the PRISM papers.)

Comment author: atucker 23 August 2011 12:55:32AM -1 points [-]

Upon reading the papers, it seems like were talking about different things.

I was talking about what I thought consciousness was (like, what I would label as conscious and unconscious), and I think you were talking about what it does/is for.

Comment author: gwern 23 August 2011 01:11:19AM 1 point [-]

Is there a difference between what something is and what something does?

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 22 August 2011 06:59:40AM 2 points [-]

There are plenty of animals that can mediate between conflicting impulses, which don't seem very conscious. Like cows, or frogs.

What makes you think that? I'm not entirely sure of frogs, but cows seem obviously conscious to me.

Comment author: Bugmaster 23 August 2011 10:00:50AM 1 point [-]

I've got to agree, Blindsight is an excellent example. It successfully (IMHO) portrays aliens that are clearly quite intelligent, and yet utterly inhuman.

* SPOILERS SPOILERS *

The most frightening thing about them is that none of the usual tropes apply to them; mutual understanding and/or empathy isn't an option because their psychology (or possibly lack thereof) makes it completely impossible. There's nothing there to empathize with.

Comment author: [deleted] 21 August 2011 06:06:32PM 0 points [-]

I think you meant Rot13.

Comment author: Jack 21 August 2011 06:38:08PM 0 points [-]

Yes. The two keys are right next to each other on my keyboard :-)

Comment author: PhilGoetz 22 August 2011 07:40:52PM 5 points [-]

An interesting exercise would be to try to imagine a society of humans whose minds operated the way most intellectuals today imagine human minds operate.

For instance, see the recent post by LukeProg on values being relative. What would people be like if they really did have states as terminal values, the way folk psychology says they do?

Another exercise is: What would society be like if everyone knew how their minds operated? How would we act if people didn't believe in free will? (Asking that question gives me a headache... it seems to imply that we have free will.) How would we act if we were rational utility-maximizers?

Comment author: Vladimir_Golovin 21 August 2011 03:52:36PM *  7 points [-]

Look into eusocial animals, e.g. ants, bees, wasps, termites, and naked mole rats. Intelligent minds of similar evolutionary origin would be very different from ours.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 22 August 2011 01:28:53AM 6 points [-]

That depends on whether they're intelligent on an individual or a hive level. After all, we are in a sense eusocial collections of cells.

Comment author: David_Allen 22 August 2011 04:56:13PM 3 points [-]

Relative rate of thinking. The universe may appear to be very different to very fast or slow thinkers relative to humans.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 22 August 2011 07:43:44PM 1 point [-]

Also, relative rate of return on investment, and relative lifespan.

Comment author: fubarobfusco 22 August 2011 01:39:42AM 3 points [-]

Tweak the bandwidth of information exchange and see what you get. With weaker communication powers, you get most nonhuman social animals on Earth, from ants to wolves to prairie dogs: able to exchange meaningful information ("food here"; "predator there") but not to express abstractions. How about with higher-bandwidth or more powerful information exchange? Suppose that I could, in the space of a few seconds of speech, convey not merely a fact, but the equivalent of paragraphs of information as to how I knew that fact?

(Or, of course, I could lie. Is increased bandwidth really all that useful? If so, why don't we have it?)

Alternately:

Some have suggested that a human mind is a sort of symbiote between genetic replicators (the human body including brain) and memetic replicators (culture, language, social behaviors, ideas). Certain aspects of human behavior are relatively constant across cultures, while others are highly variable. For instance, there are many different languages, but they all fit certain common patterns, because they have to be learned by a human brain.

Suppose that the relative strength of cultural-memetic replicators is increased: a species in which any given biological individual can be expected to participate not only in several different cultural milieux over the course of its life, but where a process somewhere between religious conversion and career-change takes the significance that reproduction has for humans. Converting other adults to follow your religion/worldview/profession/habits/hobbies/quirks strongly dominates reproduction and child-care as demands on organisms' energy. Rather than a reproductively successful individual being one who has several children, and a "loser" being someone who cannot find a mate, a successful person of this species is expected to have several followers or students in different aspects of life, and a "loser" is someone who is not imitated by anyone in any regard.

Comment author: djcb 21 August 2011 02:15:51PM 3 points [-]

Ah, that's a very intruiging question - to which we probably won't get any better answer that what we can come up with through speculation...

It's really, really hard to extrapolate from n=1 intelligent species, but as you suggest, there may be some universals; some things I would consider in coming up with a credible alien intelligence:

  • map intelligence vs mind properties for various earth species, and consider how the properties could change if you'd have a much more intelligent species (i.e., a more intelligent species may have more introspective control over things like boredom, akrasia and so on.)
  • consider how the natural enviroment may influence the group size, amount of coordination needed and so on

Then there's the fact that certain traits may make it much more likely to encounter aliens that have them - if they don't have the need or curiosity to go beyond their home ground, it's much less likely you would encounter them.

I feel however that it is really hard to think about so very different minds. While I don't subscribe to his non-reductionist views of the mind, Thomas Nagel's What is it like to be a bat? is a classic in this area, as it's reprinted in The Mind's I.

Anyway, good luck writing your fiction!

Comment author: Manfred 21 August 2011 05:36:40PM 4 points [-]

Spread of your genes is what's optimized for by evolution - all of our values are conditional on the reality of how we live and spread our genes. Hive creature? Different values. Solitary creature? Different values. Underwater? Values. Cannibalistic? Eating babies is an important value, it's unwise to make the relativistic claim that it's just "social" - that's a slippery slope to societies with no babyeating at all.

Comment author: Eugine_Nier 23 August 2011 07:14:42AM 2 points [-]

In this post Robin Hanson presents a plausible vaguely anthropic argument that alien psychology (as well as physiology) may be more like human then you'd expect.

Comment author: PhilGoetz 22 August 2011 07:46:38PM 2 points [-]

It's hard to imagine something stranger than things that already exist, like eusocial insects, slime molds, solitary mammals, total winner-take-all reproduction, parasites, or species that don't care for or recognize their young.

Comment author: Armok_GoB 21 August 2011 10:00:11PM 2 points [-]

Ooh, I love this kind of thing! (i also consider myself very good at it) However, I can't really communicate somehting as complex as the kind of idea that makes a non gimmicky, truly alien mind through static text, mainly because I suck at explaining things that way. And I am confident the results will be much better if it us customized to the story anyway. So, I suggest we meet up over IM for a brainstorm session. As I said, I love this kind of stuff and will do it just for fun without you needing to mention me in the credits or anything like that if you don't want to.

Comment author: Jack 21 August 2011 02:49:17PM 2 points [-]

A species that evolved intelligence but for which the social brain hypothesis is false might be very different-- but I don't know if it is plausible that such a species would develop a civilization.

Comment author: ScottMessick 21 August 2011 04:34:01PM 5 points [-]

Do you mean what Eliezer calls the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis? (That is, human intelligence evolved via runaway sexual selection--people who were politically competent were more reproductively successful, and as people got better and better at the game of politics, so too did the game get harder and harder, hence the feedback loop.)

Perhaps a species could evolve intelligence without such a mechanism, if something about their environment is just dramatically more complex in a peculiar way compared with ours, so that intelligence was worthwhile just for non-social purposes. The species' ancestors may have been large predators on top of the food chain, where members are typically solitary and territorial and hunt over a large region of land, with its ecosystem strangely different from ours in some way that I'm not specifying (but you'd need a pretty clever idea about it to make this whole thing work).

These aliens wouldn't be inherently social the way humans are, but they wouldn't be antisocial either--they would have noticed that cooperation allows them to solve even more difficult problems and get even more from their environment. (Still in a pre-technological stage. Remember, something about this environment is such that it provides a nearly smooth, practically unbounded (in difficulty) array of puzzles/problems to solve with increasing rewards.) Eventually, they may build a civilization just to more efficiently organize to obtain these benefits, which will also allow them to advance technologically. (I'm probably drawing too sharp of a distinction between technological advancement and interaction with their strangely complex environment.)

They might lack the following trait that is very central to human nature: affection through familiarity. When we spend a lot of time with a person/thing/activity/idea, we grow fond of it. They might not have this, or they might not have it in such generality (e.g. they might still have it for, say, mates, if they reproduce sexually). They might also be a lot less biased than we are by social considerations, for the obvious reason, but perhaps they have less raw cognitive horsepower (their environment being no substitute for the human pastimes of politics and sex).

Recklessly speculative, obviously, but I gather that's all we can hope to offer to Solvent.

Comment author: open_sketchbook 24 August 2011 04:54:17AM *  3 points [-]

We might imagine a predator who hunts prey who are developing intelligence via the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis, but lacks precision manipulaton abilities so are unable to do much more than hide and run in increasingly clever ways (perhaps they are snake-like) and thus their predators must evolve to be smart enough to trick or trap them before eventually breaking through into tool use and eventually building some kind of civilization. Such a creature might view all social interaction as competative; imagine trying to have a discussion with somebody who is biologically driven to try and trick, betray or decieve you with every action.

Comment author: Will_Newsome 21 August 2011 01:03:01PM 3 points [-]

My impression is that convergent evolution is commonplace. Boredom or equivalent algorithms are necessary for any complex learning. Emotions are molded by game theory. Once you have an intelligent social animal the selection pressures relentlessly shape the mind. If I met an alien I wouldn't be surprised if he or she was almost exactly like me in a lot of ways, to the extent that he or she would describe similar drug experiences and have similar archetypes in his or her fiction. In their vast diversity humans vary about as much as biological minds can vary. Think of it as a challenge: I'd be very interested in alien minds that clearly took these considerations into account but still ended up truly bizarre.

Comment author: Pavitra 21 August 2011 05:05:14PM 8 points [-]

On the other hand, the aliens could (for example) have emotions encoding a different game-theoretic strategy, or a different prior over what games it's going to have to play.

Comment author: FiftyTwo 21 August 2011 11:38:58PM *  7 points [-]

For example, boredom is useful in a hunter gatherer, but in an ambush predator it would be counter-productive as their optimum strategy might be remaining in the same place for long periods.

Comment author: Clippy 22 August 2011 06:40:59PM 3 points [-]

Do felines not experience boredom?

Comment author: PhilGoetz 22 August 2011 06:56:21PM *  1 point [-]

Interesting question. They enjoy playing, but they also enjoy lying in one place for hours at a time.

Is boredom with an activity different from not enjoying the activity? Are zombies bored? I would say they are not.

Comment author: Clippy 22 August 2011 08:02:26PM 2 points [-]

Zombies are fake.

Comment author: Jack 21 August 2011 02:38:08PM 2 points [-]

In their vast diversity humans vary about as much as biological minds can vary.

Can you be more precise about your reasons? I'm sure they're in the linking articles somewhere but there's a bit too much there for me to comprehend.

Comment author: Will_Newsome 21 August 2011 02:42:21PM 2 points [-]

Sorry, I didn't mean to imply that there were already existent strong arguments for that; it's just my personal speculation. I think it's one of those things where I could type for a few days straight and still not accurately describe my intuitions and their origins. Better to just read a ton of vaguely relevant stuff, I think.

Comment author: DavidPlumpton 23 August 2011 12:44:56AM *  2 points [-]

How about:

  • Enhancing the brain with hardware for that memory/intelligence boost.
  • Superior intuition for probability
  • Different/worse optical illusions/blind spots from different optical nerve wiring
  • Superior 3D spatial visualization for ocean dwellers
  • Creatures that get stuck in a correlation/causation confusion and manage to continue along mostly successfully
  • Types of synaesthesia far more elaborate than in Humans
  • A conflict between intelligence and instinct where instinct is in total control but intelligence knows it's doing the wrong thing
  • Minds partitioned more finely than the human left/right hemisphere split, with more independence between them
  • Species that specialize their intelligence like insects becoming workers/warriors/queens/drones etc. but for intelligence

Lots of fun possibilities in this area.

Comment author: dbaupp 23 August 2011 08:21:58AM 3 points [-]

Species that specialize their intelligence like insects becoming workers/warriors/queens/drones etc. but for intelligence.

Humans do this (and increasingly so). e.g. we have physicists, mathematicians, economists, psychologists etc.

Comment author: open_sketchbook 24 August 2011 04:45:40AM 1 point [-]

Perhaps one might imagine a creature that essentially cultivates multiple personalities disorder for each task they perform, where the task at hand is (more or less) their utility function, unless something like survival instict kicked in an override?

Comment author: lessdazed 24 August 2011 06:13:35AM 2 points [-]

Imagine a creature that didn't do that!

Comment author: novalis 23 August 2011 06:06:31PM 1 point [-]

You have read A Fire Upon The Deep, right?

Alternately, imagine being able to explicitly fork and merge streams of cognition as easily and explicitly as one can fork code in git. You could imagine each stream gets its own set of permissions, so the left hand might really not know what the right tentacle is doing.

Humans (roughly) desire to be happy. Imagine aliens who desire to be angry instead.

Comment author: Vaniver 23 August 2011 06:37:34PM 7 points [-]

Humans (roughly) desire to be happy. Imagine aliens who desire to be angry instead.

Isn't it the act of desiring that makes it happiness, not the name?

Comment author: novalis 23 August 2011 07:14:06PM 0 points [-]

Only sort of.

While we are happy we have certain mental dispositions which are unrelated to the ones we desire when we desire happiness. Happy people are more likely to give to charity. Happy people (or at least people on certain antidepressants) are also more likely to judge harming others as wrong -- whether this translates into less actual harm, I don't know. Further, people tend to prefer that others be happy -- that's why people are always telling depressed people to smile.

Imagine that in these aliens, happiness worked in terms of its behavioral effects as it does in humans, as did anger. But aliens might still want themselves to be angry even as they want others to be happy.

Comment author: Vaniver 23 August 2011 10:19:13PM 3 points [-]

Further, people tend to prefer that others be happy -- that's why people are always telling depressed people to smile.

Yes, but also smiling makes people happier. So it is pretty good advice for depressed people.

But aliens might still want themselves to be angry even as they want others to be happy.

By this you mean that when these aliens get what they want, instead of feeling content and magnanimous, they feel discontent and destructive? Don't you see how that could be an evolutionary handicap?

Comment author: jhuffman 24 August 2011 06:27:50PM 0 points [-]

I'm not sure anger necessarily leads to discontent. If you want to get mad as hell and break things, you might feel better after doing so if you've been stifling a lot of discontent up to then. I don't really pretend to know what's going on in the head of a rioter but this seems possible.

Comment author: Vaniver 24 August 2011 09:33:33PM 2 points [-]

I don't mean that actions anger predisposes you toward leave you discontented, I mean that part of the physiological emotion of anger is discontentment.

Comment author: novalis 24 August 2011 01:07:08AM 0 points [-]

Yeah, I guess it could be a handicap. But then human brains have so many bizarre flaws and spandrels that I think we could get away with swapping a few of ours for this one.

Comment author: lessdazed 22 August 2011 06:37:24AM *  1 point [-]

An alien species might be very adaptive, able to learn new things exclusively - and efficiently - by media such as audio, video, and text. Such a species might not have its culture organized around the seizing of others and agglomerating their brains and the defense from likewise. Prictualcre to determine who eats from whom, and how much brain to take, and how much work must be put into studying directly from books, and concomitant social enforcement mechanisms regulating such might be entirely absent. At first glance, that seems like a lot, though not everything that makes us who we are, but a bit of thought will reveal how deeply prictualcre is embedded in not just our culture but our biology, and in fact a species without it would be almost unimaginably strange. We simply don't notice it because of its universality on biological, cultural, and other levels.

Comment author: lessdazed 23 August 2011 11:56:18PM 0 points [-]

I wonder what, if any, the relationship is between several things: predicting what humans will learn about the laws of nature, and predicting what alien life is likely to be like, for both an estimate and confidence in it.

It feels incongruous that I am relatively agnostic and uncertain about alien life's form (assuming it exists) but somewhat confident physics is close to hitting bedrock within the century.

I could just be ill-informed and reasoning poorly. Even so, I would expect patterns to those shortcomings.