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DuncanS comments on The Apparent Reality of Physics - Less Wrong Discussion

-3 Post author: ec429 23 September 2011 08:10PM

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Comment author: DuncanS 24 September 2011 12:01:38AM 0 points [-]

Surely can't be exactly what you mean, as exists(our Univese) and ¬exists(everything else) seems coherent if rather unlikely, and seems consistent at our present state of knowledge with ¬exists(infinite sets).

It seems your 'exists' concept is pretty much indistinguishable from 'logically coherent', and that that's the whole point you're trying to make - that we're in no position to distinguish these, and should simply abandon the 'exists'.

Comment author: ec429 24 September 2011 12:14:24AM 0 points [-]

Surely can't be exactly what you mean, as exists(our Univese) and ¬exists(everything else) seems coherent if rather unlikely

I would dispute this, on the grounds that my deductions in formal systems come from somewhere that has a causal relation to my brain - the formal system causes me to be more likely to deduce the things which are valid deductions than the things that aren't. So, if I 'exist', I maintain that the formal systems have to 'exist' too, unless you're happy with 'existing' things being causally influenced by 'non-existing' things - in which case there's not a lot of point in asserting that ¬exists(infinite sets). A definition of 'exists' which doesn't satisfy my coherence requirements is, I am attempting to argue, simply a means of sneaking in connotations.