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endoself comments on A signaling theory of class x politics interaction - Less Wrong Discussion
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I generally accept the signalling argument, but this isn't necessarily a monocausal situation. Other possibilities:
Economic -- the wealthy and the very poor aren't consuming the same goods, but the very poor and the lower middle class are. Giving more money to the very poor raises the prices of the goods that the lower middle class buys.
Psychological -- The lower middle class aspire to be wealthy. They don't want to raise taxes on the rich because they are hoping to be rich themselves in the future. The very poor probably also hope against hope to be rich later, but when immediate circumstances are desperate enough, the immediate aspiration is just to be not-extremely poor.
I don't think most people think about this sort of economics.
Probably not explicitly, but people might attach more emotional weight to "nearby" economic changes. Maybe benefits to the relatively rich feel far off, while benefits to the relatively poor feel like a risk of being overtaken?
This strikes me as an extension of signaling. The boundary between signaling something and believing something can get pretty fuzzy.
This sound like the last-place aversion discussed in the post. I agree that there could be a negative affect toward `falling into last place', but I don't think people are worried about not being able to afford as much stuff. The former is intuitive, while the latter requires knowledge of economics, which simply isn't common knowledge in our society.