Alejandro1 comments on A signaling theory of class x politics interaction - Less Wrong Discussion
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This gives the impression that the upper-middle class support wealth redistribution at higher rates than the lower-middle class. I'm open minded but I would be quite surprised if that were actually true. That doesn't mean there is nothing to explain-- the lower-middle class still seems to oppose measures that would objectively make them richer at surprisingly high rates. But it isn't as if self-interest doesn't explain a great deal of voting behavior.
Some things to consider:
Does opposition to redistribution usually increase during bad economic times? The answer is no for many examples that come to my head. But what I do know is an effect of a bad economy is animosity toward whomever is in power. It is plausible the recession simply correlates with "disputing positions associated with Barack Obama".
Ideological stickiness or coalition logic
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The Farmer-forager binary. In particular consider that fear made farmers. If egalitarianism is associated with forager thinking then fear caused by economic uncertainty would trigger farmer-type anti-egalitarianism and an emphasis on self-reliance. Those with the most precarious economic situations are the ones most likely to oppose egalitarianism as the economy gets worse.
In particular, the farmer-forager thesis explains the following puzzle that the signaling theory does not. If opposition to welfare is driven by people signaling that they don't need it we should expect the people most likely to oppose welfare to be those most likely to be mistaken for being on welfare. In particular, we should expect lower-middle class African Americans to be especially worried about looking like they're on the dole and therefore especially vociferous in their opposition to welfare. But we in fact we find the opposite: African Americans overwhelming support welfare programs relative to whites. And this response is exactly what one would expect with the "more for mine" attitude associated with farmer norms. Fearful occasions of resource uncertainty cause us to shrink or sphere of moral concern, be less willing to share and be more suspicious of strangers especially those who look different. Also note that the rates of redistribution in more homogeneous European states-- particularly Scandinavia -- vastly outstrip rates in more diverse countries like the US.
This was one of my first thoughts, too. Most people are uninformed about politics and economics, and do not go much beyond "blaming the government (and by extension the policies associated with it) when stuff goes badly, and credit it when it goes well". One could in principle test it by making similar polls about attitudes to redistribution in countries that have had right-wing governments during most of the recession. In general, one must first check that effects of this kind are independent of contingent, local political cicumstances, before seeking explanations in terms of universal psychological mechanisms.
This has been historically validated, at least to the extent of a significant swing of a few percent (which is usually enough to tip an election if it happens nationally).