You did a good job with this post

Thanks!

No one cares about the properties of ideologies of humans extrapolated from any more than they care about the color of those humans' clothes, people just care about the properties of the end product. If the product is the same whether the clothes are red or blue, and the same whether humans' ideologies are parochially good or universally good or universally bad, then those things are irrelevant.

That is certainly true (the fact that only the output of the dynamic is overwhelmingly important is what I was getting at with those excessive mentions of “shut up and multiply”). But if the implementation of the initial dynamic is less than ideal, then there may not be perfect independence between the output and any strong ideological strain or value that someone managed to implant in a relatively small group of people.

Knowing more, thinking faster and growing up closer together may very well render such a problem completely irrelevant, but that doesn’t constitute a reason to assume that these specifications will do so given their implementation by human programmers. This is a point in favour of the universal CEV, but similar considerations apply in favour of the selective CEV (as I attempted to show in my essay).

Stop doing that!

I’ve retracted that comment. I suppose that the careful use of probabilistic terms is important in general.