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TheOtherDave comments on In favour of a selective CEV initial dynamic - Less Wrong Discussion
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Leaving all the in-group/out-group anxiety aside, and assuming I were actually in a position where I get to choose whose volition to extrapolate, there's three options: ...humanity's extrapolated volition is inconsistent with mine (in which case I get less of what I want by using humanity's judgement rather than my own),
...HEV is consistent with, but different from, mine (in which case I get everything I want either way), or
...HEV is identical to mine (in which case I get everything I want either way).
So HEV <= mine.
That said, others more reliably get more of what they want using HEV than using mine, which potentially makes it easier to obtain their cooperation if they think I'm going to use HEV. So I should convince them of that.
But they'd prefer just the CEV of you two to the one of all humanity, and the same goes for each single human who'd raise that objection. The end result is the CEV of you+everyone hat could have stopped you. And this dosn't need handling before you make it either: I'm pretty sure it arises naturally from TDT if you implement your own and were only able to do so because you used this argument on a bunch of people.