I agree that the question should have been worded better, and yes, it's loaded semantically. But I think it's factually true that for purposes of purchasing happiness, status, lack-of-suffering, preference-satisfaction or most other metrics I can think of that matter to individual people, people are likely to value a dollar more highly if they have fewer of them.
(Yes, I realize that's still operating within a framework, but as soon as you're talking about "what something means to someone" as supposed to "what something is capable of purchasing" you're inherently defining the issue in terms of "what people care about" rather than "what things can purchase," and yes, I think that means the question has a factual answer)
But I think it's factually true that for purposes of purchasing happiness, status, lack-of-suffering, preference-satisfaction or most other metrics I can think of that matter to individual people, people are likely to value a dollar more highly if they have fewer of them.
And you just switched back from context #2 to context #1.
This is, frankly, frustrating my hope of a dialogue here. Do you recognize, at least, that you have done this? (Changed contexts / rephrasings)?
You can't discuss "what does this say of my value as a person" in terms of "how useful is this?"
Value ethics are not utility ethics.
A article in the Atlantic, linked to by someone on the unofficial LW IRC channel caught my eye. Nothing all that new for LessWrong readers, but still it is good to see any mention of such biases in mainstream media.
I break here to comment that I don't see why we would expect this to be so given the reality of academia.