Hum, no, it means that I don't use raw consequentialism/utilitarianism as my ethical framework. I consider them to be theoretically valid, but not directly usable by humans who are unable to forsee all the consequences of their act, and who have so many biases.
So while I can use consequentialism to reason on meta-ethics, and even to amend my ethical rules, I don't use it to take ethical decisions. I don't trust myself to do that. And in my current framework of ethics, sheltering Jews from Hitler is something that should be done, regardless of the risk taken by myself.
(nods) There's a reason I didn't say anything about what you would do, but rather about what I would.
That said, I'm curious... can you clarify what you mean by "amend my ethical rules" here?
For example... so, OK, at the moment your ethical rules include the rule that "sheltering Jews from Hitler is something that should be done regardless of the risk [to you]". Let's assume for simplicity that it also includes no rules that conflict with that rule. It follows that, given the choice to shelter a Jew or not, you shelter... that's straigh...
Today's post, Mere Messiahs was originally published on 02 December 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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