There are also people in every possible state of suffering. So my question is: is it wrong to switch the computer on, setting it executing all those programs simultaneously in different histories? Is it, in fact, the worst crime ever committed? Or is it merely inadvisable, because the combined measure of all the histories containing suffering is very tiny? Or is it innocent and trivial?
I'm not so sure we have the computing power to "simulate a person," but suppose we did. (Perhaps we will soon.) How would you respond to this worry?
Pascal's Mugging rang. It wants tree-fiddy.
Assuming we have sufficiently dense register as to provide for a human consciousness within a quantum randomizer's memory bank.
Assuming many-worlds.
Every available mental state would occur infinitely many times despite being an infinitessimal likelihood of the device. Those mental states where the suffering is sufficiently great as to cause the sentience to prefer not existing at all is necessarily a minor portion of the total of those who suffer. Those who neither suffer nor prosper likely also prefer existing, in the main. Those who prosper also overwhelmingly (likely) prefer to exist.
Should we allow those entities, hypothetically, to vote on whether they should be brought into existence at all - as a group, it is my belief that they would vote "yes".
Of course, I'm something of a heretic here at LW in that I do not accept postulate #2. (Note: I do not accept the "Copenhagen Interpretation" either.)
- Assuming we have sufficiently dense register as to provide for a human consciousness within a quantum randomizer's memory bank.
- Assuming many-worlds.
Also:
From David Deutsch's The Beginning of Infinity:
I'm not so sure we have the computing power to "simulate a person," but suppose we did. (Perhaps we will soon.) How would you respond to this worry?