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Larks comments on CEV-inspired models - Less Wrong Discussion

7 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 07 December 2011 06:35PM

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Comment author: Larks 07 December 2011 07:36:27PM 1 point [-]

one cheap and easy method (with surprisingly good properties) is to take the maximal possible expected utility (the expected utility that person would get if the AI did exactly what they wanted) as 1, and the minimal possible expected utility (if the AI was to work completely against them) as 0.

"if the AI did exactly what they wanted" as opposed to "if the universe went exactly as they wanted" to avoid issues with unbounded utility functions? This seems like it might not be enough if the universe itself were unbounded in the relivant sense.

For example, suppose my utility function is U(Universe) = #paperclips, which is unbounded in a big universe. Then you're going to normalise me as assigning U(AI becomes clippy) = 1, and U(individual paperclips) = 0.

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 December 2011 09:41:40AM 1 point [-]

For example, suppose my utility function is U(Universe) = #paperclips, which is unbounded in a big universe. Then you're going to normalise me as assigning U(AI becomes clippy) = 1, and U(individual paperclips) = 0.

Yep.

So most likely a certain proportion of the universe will become paperclips.