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steven0461 comments on CEV-inspired models - Less Wrong Discussion

7 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 07 December 2011 06:35PM

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Comment author: steven0461 07 December 2011 09:42:57PM 5 points [-]

That seems like it may be true of every scheme that doesn't consider the causal origins of people's utility functions. Does something like Gibbard-Satterthwaite apply?

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 December 2011 11:32:14AM 1 point [-]

Not specifically causal origins (there's evolution), instead I suppose there might be a way of directly negating most effects resulting from such strategic considerations (that is, decisions that were influenced by their expected effect on the decision in question that wants to negate that effect).

Comment author: Stuart_Armstrong 08 December 2011 02:19:10PM *  0 points [-]

"Easy" way of doing this: see what would have happened if everyone believed that you were using a model where liars don't prosper (ie random dictator), but actually use a Pareto method.

Comment author: cousin_it 08 December 2011 01:42:31AM *  0 points [-]

Considering the causal origins of people's utility functions is a nice hack, thanks for pointing it out! How far back do we need to go, though? Should my children benefit if I manipulate their utility function genetically while they're in the womb?

Another way to aggregate utility functions is by simulated bargaining, but it's biased in favor of rich and powerful people.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 08 December 2011 04:24:47PM 2 points [-]

How far back do we need to go, though?

As far as needed to understand (the dependence of current agent's values on (the dependence of (expected benefit from value extraction) on current agent's values)). (Sorry, adding parens was simpler!)

This involves currently confusing "benefit" (to whom?) and assumed-mistaken "expected" (by whom?), supposedly referring to aspects of past agents (that built/determined the current agent) deciding on the strategic value bargaining. (As usual, ability to parse the world and see things that play the roles of elements of agents' algorithms seems necessary to get anything of this sort done.)

Comment author: Larks 08 December 2011 02:02:49AM 0 points [-]

If I'm rich it's because I delayed consumption, allowing others to invest the capital that I had earned. Should we not allow these people some return on their investment?

To be clear, I'm not very sure the answer is yes; but nor do I think it's clear that 'wealth' falls into the category of 'things that should not influence CEV', where things like 'race', 'eye colour' etc. live.

Comment author: cousin_it 08 December 2011 02:18:33AM *  6 points [-]

Fair point about delayed gratification, but you may also be rich because your parents were rich, or because you won the lottery, or because you robbed someone. Judging people by their bargaining power conflates all those possible reasons.

Comment author: Larks 08 December 2011 10:36:09PM 0 points [-]

No; if you didn't delay gratification you'd spend the money quickly, regardless of how you got it.

Comment author: cousin_it 08 December 2011 11:05:05PM *  1 point [-]

The funniest counterexample I know is Jefri Bolkiah =)

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 09 December 2011 10:24:29AM 0 points [-]

If you didn't delay gratification and had expensive tastes, you'd spend the money quickly, regardless of how you got it.

Even if everyone did have expensive tastes, people who started off with less money would need to delay their gratification more. A very poor person might need to delay gratification an average of 80% of the time, since they couldn't afford almost anything. A sufficiently rich person might only need to delay gratification 10% of the time without running into financial trouble. So if you wanted to reward delaying of gratification, then on average the poorer that a person was, the more you'd want to reward him

Comment author: timtyler 08 December 2011 12:44:18PM *  -1 points [-]

Another way to aggregate utility functions is by simulated bargaining, but it's biased in favor of rich and powerful people.

The same rich and powerful people who are most likely to be funding the research, maybe?

Today, to resolve their differences, people mostly just bargain I.R.L.

They do simulate bargains in their heads, but only to help them with the actual bargaining.