I accept the fact that a lot of what my mind does is Turing reducible. But ALL of it? I have this salient experience of consciousness and I am completely unaware of any satisfying theory as to the source or mechanism of consciousness. My intutions about consciousness and Turing machines do not particularly point to an actual internal perception of consciousness as being Turing reducible.

The "Turing test" that an emulation of me would have to pass is this: I would engage my emulation in a challenging discuossion of consciousness in which I would certainly ask my emulation if it was conscious and if it was, how it would convince me it was. If it is anything like me, it would almost certainly make the same challenges to me. I would challenge it as to whether it was the emulation or I was, and how could we tell the difference. I would tell it that I was the real deal because of the details of the physical sensation I have of the world around me, the slight pain in my stomach and other body parts, the feeling of weight and compression on the parts of my body on which I am sitting. Most emulation discussion concentrates on duplicating the function of the brain. But the constant inputs to the brain of all the sensors and feedback from using muscles, requires that the emulation have a pretty complex simulation of the world for the emulation to interact with. I would do things like pinch myself while watching my skin and tell my emulation what that felt like and what I saw on my skin as I did that.

For me, the important criterion of passing the Turing test would NOT be passed by myself and my emulation being unsure which of us was which, or more in the spirit of the Turing test, a 3rd party being unable to pick which of us was the emulation by looking at a transcript of the conversation. For me the more important passing of the test would be that each of my emulation and I were able to figure out which of us is the emulation but my emulation in this discussion would still earnestly claim that it was conscious, and would, given it had all my memories, be able to tell me interesting things about how it was different being an emulation vs a "real boy." Of course if my emulation earnestly reported to me that it thought it was real and therefore I was the emulation, that could work too. But the important point for me is it would be my conclusion that I was talking to something conscious and intelligent that would be important to me, not that I was talking to something that could trick me into not knowing whether it was a physical human being or not.

I think the question of what counts as a person is incredibly subtle, and incredibly unanswered up to this point. I think we will need some significant experience with machine "persons" before we can say with any real confidence at all what the answers to those questions are.