I agree that type-1 and type-2 systems are both possible.
A number of hypotheses that I would label "strong AI" don't claim that type-2 systems are impossible, they merely claim that type-1 systems can be constructed by means other than gestating a zygote. (That said, I don't think it matters much what we attach the label "strong AI" to.)
Re: your question... it's probably worth saying that I don't believe that it's possible in practice to construct a classic Chinese Room (that is, one in which the rules for how to respond to inputs are entirely captured as instructions that a human, or a group of humans, can successfully execute) that can emulate a person. Or simulate one, for that matter.
But OK, for the sake of answering your question, I will hypothetically assume that I'm wrong, and someone has done so to build TheChineseDave, and that I am convinced that TheChineseDave is a person.
Yes, in that hypothetical scenario, I would feel that sending all the people inside home and ending the experiment would constitute killing a person. (Or perhaps suspending that person's life, if it is possible to pick up TheChineseDave where it left off, which it seems like it ought to be.)
Also, as specified I would probably consider it an ethical killing, since TheChineseDave's continued existence depends on, but does not justify, the involuntary labor of the people inside the room. But I suspect that's beside your point.
Yes, in that hypothetical scenario, I would feel that sending all the people inside home and ending the experiment would constitute killing a person. (Or perhaps suspending that person's life, if it is possible to pick up TheChineseDave where it left off, which it seems like it ought to be.)
I think the moral component of emulation and how we get there needs to be explored. I may think killing an 18 year old genius is ethical if he dies incidental to my saving 700 lives on a crashing airliner in some easy to construct hypothetical. But the point is his...
Suppose I have choice between the following:
A) One simulation of me is run for me 100 years, before being deleted.
B) Two identical simulations of me are run for 100 years, before being deleted.
Is the second choice preferable to the first? Should I be willing to pay more to have multiple copies of me simulated, even if those copies will have the exact same experiences?
Forgive me if this question has been answered before. I have Googled to no avail.