This selection pressure only exists if religion is already a universal in the society. If Ugg, from three huts over, says that everyone in the tribe must believe in his imaginary friend, or else he will kill them, the selection that actually happens will work against Ugg.
I'm not sure if this is actually true. The idea of religion is appealing enough that Ugg may be able to sell it to them. After all, Christian missionaries often succeed in displacing an old religion.
Besides, is the naïve argument really incorrect? The reason group selection fails is that individual selection is stronger. But if, by chance, religion grows to dominance in a tribe, then becoming irreligious is no longer an individual fitness gain. The two selection pressures point in the same direction.
I'm not sure if this is actually true. The idea of religion is appealing enough that Ugg may be able to sell it to them. After all, Christian missionaries often succeed in displacing an old religion.
The question is why are human brains wired such that this is the case?
Today's post, A Failed Just-So Story was originally published on 05 January 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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