So in Eliezer's meta-ethics he talks about the abstract computation called "right", whereas in e.g. CEV he talks about stuff like reflective endorsement. So in other words in one place he's talking about goodness as a formal cause and in another he's talking about goodness as a final cause. Does he argue anywhere that these should be expected to be the same thing?
Not explicitly. He does in various places talk about why alternative considerations of abstract 'rightness' - some sort of objective morality or something - are absurd. He does give some details on his reductionist moral realism about the place but I don't recall where.
Incidentally I haven't seen Eliezer talk about formal or final causes about anything, ever. (And they don't seem to be especially useful concepts to me.)
Incidentally I haven't seen Eliezer talk about formal or final causes about anything, ever. (And they don't seem to be especially useful concepts to me.)
Aren't "formal cause" and "final cause" just synonyms for "shape" and "purpose", respectively?
This is for anyone in the LessWrong community who has made at least some effort to read the sequences and follow along, but is still confused on some point, and is perhaps feeling a bit embarrassed. Here, newbies and not-so-newbies are free to ask very basic but still relevant questions with the understanding that the answers are probably somewhere in the sequences. Similarly, LessWrong tends to presume a rather high threshold for understanding science and technology. Relevant questions in those areas are welcome as well. Anyone who chooses to respond should respectfully guide the questioner to a helpful resource, and questioners should be appropriately grateful. Good faith should be presumed on both sides, unless and until it is shown to be absent. If a questioner is not sure whether a question is relevant, ask it, and also ask if it's relevant.