Also relatively short laws rather than a long regress into greater and greater complexity at higher and higher energies would be expected in a simulation (but would be very very weak evidence).
If we use Occam's razor, I think you got that backwards. Conditional on us not being in a simulation, we should be in close to the simplest possible universe that could sustain complex life. But it would be difficult for the simulators to figure out the simplest design that would get them what they want, and even if they could, they might choose to sacrifice some simplicity for ease of execution (e.g. wavefunction collapse, as Normal_Anomaly suggested).
Also, faster-than-light neutrinos could be a bug in a simulation.
Which way you think this goes probably depends on just how strongly you think Occam's razor should be applied. We are all compelled to let the probability of a theory's truth go to zero as it's kolmogorov complexity goes to infinity but there is no prima facia reason to think it drops off particularly fast or slow. If you think , as I do, that there is only relatively weak favoring of more simple scientific laws while intelligent creatures would favor simplicity as a cognitive technique for managing complexity quite strongly you get my conclusion. But I'll admit the other direction isn't implausible.
The recent article on overcomingbias suggesting the Fermi paradox might be evidence our universe is indeed a simulation prompted me to wonder how one would go about gathering evidence for or against the hypothesis that we are living in a simulation. The Fermi paradox isn't very good evidence but there are much more promising places to look for this kind of evidence. Of course there is no sure fire way to learn that one isn't in a simulation, nothing prevents a simulation from being able to perfectly simulate a non-simulation universe, but there are certainly features of the universe that seem more likely if the universe was simulated and their presence or absence thus gives us evidence about whether we are in a simulation.
In particular, the strategy suggested here is to consider the kind of fingerprints we might leave if we were writing a massive simulation. Of course the simulating creatures/processes may not labor under the same kind of restrictions we do in writing simulations (their laws of physics might support fundamentally different computational devices and any intelligence behind such a simulation might be totally alien). However, it's certainly reasonable to think we might be simulated by creatures like us so it's worth checking for the kinds of fingerprints we might leave in a simulation.
Computational Fingerprints
Simulations we write face several limitations on the computational power they can bring to bear on the problem and these limitations give rise to mitigation strategies we might observe in our own universe. These limitations include the following:
While theoretically nothing prevents the laws of physics from providing non-computable oracles, e.g., some experiment one could perform that discerns whether a given Turing machine halts (halting problem = 0') all indications suggest our universe does not provide such oracles. Thus our simulations are limited to modeling computable behavior. We would have no way to simulate a universe that had non-computable fundamental laws of physics (except perhaps randomness).
It's tempting to conclude that the fact that our universe apparently follows computable laws of physics modulo randomness provides evidence for us being a simulation but this isn't entirely clear. After all had our laws of physics provided access to non-computable oracles we would presumably not expect simulations to be so limited either. Still, this is probably weak evidence for simulation as such non-computable behavior might well exist in the simulating universe but be practically infeasable to consult in computer hardware. Thus our probability for seeing non-computable behavior should be higher conditional on not being a simulation than conditional on being a simulation.
The most compelling evidence we could discover of simulation would be the signature of a psuedo-random number generator in the outcomes of `random' QM events. Of course, as above, the simulating computers might have easy access to truly random number generators but it's also reasonable they lack practical access to true random numbers at a sufficient rate.
We always want our simulations to run faster and require less resources but we are limited by the power of our hardware. In response we often resort to less accurate approximations when possible or otherwise engineer our simulation to require less computational resources. This might appear in a simulated universe in several ways.
Arguably this is just a variant of 3 but it has some different considerations. As with 3 we would expect a simulation to bottom out and not provide arbitrarily fine grained structure but in simulations precision issues also bring with them questions of stability. If the law's of physics turn out to be relatively unaffected by tiny computational errors that would push in the direction of simulation but if they are chaotic and quickly spiral out of control in response to these errors it would push against simulation. Since linear systems are virtually always stable te linearity of QM is yet again evidence for simulation.
We find that finite speed limits on communication and other barriers prevent building arbitrarily fast single core processors. Thus we would expect a simulation to be more likely to admit highly parallel algorithms. While the finite speed of light provides some level of parallelizability (don't need to share all info with all processing units immediately) space-like QM correlations push against parallelizability. However, given the linearity of QM the most efficient parallel algorithms might well be semi-global algorithms like those used for various kinds of matrix manipulation. It would be most interesting if collapse could be shown to be a requirement/byproduct of such efficient algorithms.
Finally there is the hope one might discover something like the Pentium division bug in the behavior of the universe. Similarly one might hope to discover unexplained correlations in deviations from normal behavior, e.g., correlations that occur at evenly spaced locations relative to some frame of reference, arising from transient errors in certain pieces of hardware.
Software Fingerprints
Another type of fingerprint that might be left are those resulting from the conceptual/organizational difficulties occuring in the software design process. For instance we might find fingerprints by looking for:
Design Fingerprints
This category is so difficult I'm not really going to say much about it but I'm including it for completeness. If our universe is a simulation created by some intentional creature we might expect to see certain features receive more attention than others. Maybe we would see some really odd jiggering of initial conditions just to make sure some events of interest occurred but without a good idea what is of interest it is hard to see how this could be done. Another potential way for design fingerprints to show up is in the ease of data collection from the simulation. One might expect a simulation to make it particularly easy to sift out the interesting information from the rest of the data but again we don't have any idea what interesting might be.
Other Fingerprints
I'm hoping the readers will suggest some interesting new ideas as to what one might look for if one was serious about gathering evidence about whether we are in a simulation or not.