To me it more depends on how you estimate the probability of being able to get out of the deal given enough time to try to find loopholes or other ways to break the deal.
Part of the "discounting future utilons" comes from the fact that we don't know the future for sure, and the further the future is, the less we know about it. That applies to (some?) smokers (who don't know for sure they'll have cancer) or some criminals (who hope they'll escape justice). That "oh, I'll see when we'll get closer to it" mindset is to a point reasonable - there are many problems you can solve later. But humans tend to not multiply right - a high chance of cancer or long prison term should still outweigh the temporary gain. Or a high chance of infinity of torture.
I observe that if we take this as straight Christian theology, you cannot plan to repent, and true repentance - not just wishing to avoid the consequences! - is the only way out. For other varieties of Omega, who knows?
I was reading TV Tropes on Hell, and it occurred to me: If your discounting was sufficiently hyperbolic, or indeed plain exponential with a low enough time preference, it would in some sense be rational to take a literal Faustian bargain. The integral to infinite time of some constant amount of torture per unit time, discounted exponentially or hyperbolically, is finite; enough worldly power and pleasure would outweight it.
But this clashes rather strongly with my intuition. Notice that the argument doesn't depend on hyperbolic discounting; no preference pumping is involved. It works just fine with exponentials and a high decay constant. Or, if the worldly pleasures were strong enough, a low decay constant, that is, a high time preference, such as (I assume) most LWers have. For example, would you take eternal torture for a guarantee of living until the heat-death of the universe, 10^130 years from now, with all the refinements of Fun Theory along the way? Intuition says no, infinity being infinity, but then again intuition is notoriously bad at dealing with very large and very small numbers. If I calculate the thing in time-discounted utilons, it seems to me that my decay constant has to be very tiny indeed for me to care about what happens at the end of *10^130* years.
So should I discard my intuition, and take such a bargain if Mephistopheles should suddenly turn up? (Noting that in 10^130 years, I might learn a thing or two about getting out of such difficulties...) Or alternatively, should I stop discounting future utilons?