I think some of the comments in the original hit the nail on the head. I, personally, am skeptical about these arguments because they sounds too convenient by half: both for those who are ideologically anti-aid and those who feel bad about not giving. I notice that I used to not give money to charity before I found this out, but that I have sometimes thought this is why I wasn't giving money since I found it out. Which makes me suspicious. People in general are very happy to believe things that replace a moral tension with an intellectual argument.
On the other hand, a lot of me is tempted to say that aid does help because those devoted to helping are generally pro-aid. But that's obviously a self-selecting issue: you're not going to set up a charity to help if you don't think help HELPS. Also, in general, I think people get mixed up about sincerity. They tend to think that those with access to power and information are either right or deliberately doing the bad thing (on everything from global warming to dealing with the economic crisis). I think a more realistic view of how business and political leaders actually act and think suggests that the way they reach decisions is far nearer to the way that others do than we assume, and we can assume cock-up over conspiracy at any given time. So if aid doesn't work, I don't think that governments do it cynically for effect: I think they think it does work and tend to weigh evidence suggesting it does more heavily than evidence it doesn't.
But that's obviously a self-selecting issue: you're not going to set up a charity to help if you don't think help HELPS.
Imagine two charities, one devotes nearly all its resources to helping, the other devotes much of its resources to making itself look appealing to donors. Which one is going to get more donations and thus become bigger? The problem is that donating to charity is the ultimate credence good since the donor frequently has no way to tell whether or how much the donation is helping?
Today's post, "Can't say no" Spending was originally published on 18 October 2007. I decided to include it based on feedback in the open thread. It is a very short entry so there is no real need for a summary:
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was Superexponential Conceptspace, and Simple Words, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
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