endoself comments on Rational philosophies - Less Wrong Discussion
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I think his Tychism might have been justified. Statistics could make predictions assuming Tychism but it wasn't obvious that the same results were predicted by determinism. That's Bayesian evidence in favour of Tychism. His more useful statistical work is also impressive.
That's definitely a lot of math and logic.
That would be very impressive, but I don't see that in any of the stuff on his semiotics on Wikipedia. The passage you linked to seems to just be saying that with sufficient study it is possible to understand things. I don't see anything that anticipates information theory or knowledge as statistical modelling.
Oh, he seems to have disobeyed endoself's first law of philosophy: "Have as little to do with Hegel as possible."
A caveat: I'm not at all sure how much I'm projecting on Peirce as far as this point goes. I personally think that his writings clarified my views on the scientific method (at the time I originally read them, which was a good while back) and I was concurrently thinking about machine learning - so I might just be having a case of cached apophenia.
However; if you want a condensed version of his semiotic look over this. You might actually need to read some of the rest of that article (which, I admit, is a bit long) to put it in more context. Also, this wikipedia page looks pretty comprehensive. I'm pretty confident that they're leaving a bit out that might be clearer if you read Peirce, but I'm not sure of how much instrumental value that would be to you. The issue with reading Peirce is that he was a crazy hermit with thousands of unpublished notes who continuously updated his views in significant ways (another point for him, he continued to reconsider/shift his views in a systematic way until he died), so lots of what you read about/by Peirce is compiled from a vast repository of his notes collected from his workspace after his death.
Also, something neat I found: Peirce's three valued logic predating Post. That was among his tens of thousands of unpublished pages of notes. Going further in this direction, I found an interesting article on Peirce's logic. There is some interesting discussion there about his influence on modern logic.
Points for coolness - Simon Newcomb was quite possibly his evil arch-nemesis.
Anyway - I think what attracts me to Peirce the most is his seemingly endless ability to carve reality at the joints in novel (at the time at least) ways, coupled with his nearly superhuman productivity levels - I mean he was highly influential in the realm of statistical theory, his influence on experimental design was impressive, he invented an axiomatization for arithmetic before Peano, he invented a modern characterization of first-order logic on par with Frege's (but arguably with a more algebraic/model theoretic than syntactic approach), he was a skilled expositor and clear writer, he invented pragmaticism, he had a lifetime of smaller results in logic, earth sciences and mathematics that anyone would be proud of - what more could you want from a single person before you can understand why people admire them?
I think it's significantly more forgivable for a contemporary of Hegel's to be influenced by him than someone today being influenced by him. Further, when I say "influenced" - he scavenged a set of ideas that he seems to have reinterpreted in terms of his own philosophy because he saw that they could round out his ideas in a variety of ways - he was still pretty critical of Hegel of some major points. I think just browsing through these excerpts reveals the lines of influence a bit.
Well I saw some interesting ideas about science in Piaget, which is at least as tenuous.
Okay, I read most of this, but not in too much detail. I'm guessing that the things like
are not the crucial parts.
I'm seeing the idea that one has a partially correct theory explaining one's observations and that it is continuously refined. Is that the main idea or am I missing something? It's valid, but I don't know how it compares to other ideas at the time. Also, the emphasis seems to be on refining one's ideas by continuing to contemplate the same evidence, which isn't very empirical, but I could be misunderstanding.
That's interesting. There are a lot of people using three valued logic today as if it is a huge insight that we can have a system that classifies statements as known to be true, known to be false, and unknown, or with three other, slightly different, categories, but in Pierce's day it was an important insight (well, there were similar ideas before, but they weren't formalized).