Which leaves the question in an uncomfortable position whereby it is calling dualism a form of determinism. Indeed, any solution which posits a non-reductionist answer to the question of free will is being called determinism by your definition.

A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question "what is outside" because I thought there weren't any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?

Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you've left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they've -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is "fully determined" by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism.

Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn't call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.

Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric.

I have no idea what you mean by that.

To say Eliezer hasn't answered it in that context is to complain that he didn't preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.

He hasn't answered the question of FW because he hasn't said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.

A dualist would regard their immaterial mind as internal. I was givin a non-dualist asnwer to the question "what is outside" because I thought there weren't any dualists round here. Are you a dualist? Am I being vague because I correctly anticipated your background assumptions?

Worse still, your formulation is completely senseless in the reductionist form you've left it; you deny non-reductionist answers, but you implicitly deny all reductionist answers as well, because they've -already- answered your question: No choice happens whatsoever that is "fully determined" by things outside your central nervous system, that denies the very -concept- of reductionism.

Events happen that are fully determined by outside events, for instance if someoen pushes you out of a window. We wouldn't call them free choices, but so what? All that means is that I have correctly identified what free choice is about: my definition picks out the set of free choices.

Your question maintains meaning only as rhetoric.

I have no ide what you mean by that.

To say Eliezer hasn't answered it in that context is to complain that he didn't preface his arguments with a statement that the brain is the organ which is making these choices.

He hasn't answered the question of FW because he hasn't said anything at all about whether. or not brains can make choices that are not entirely determined by outside events.