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RobertLumley comments on Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality discussion thread, part 12 - Less Wrong Discussion
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Wait, killing Skeeter was evil?
I was under the impression that that created a tremendous dose of positive utility for pretty much everyone. Readers included.
Author's notes for chapter 27.
Rita Skeeter deserving it and her death being a positive net utility to everyone are two very different things. I doubt, however, that her existence actually was a net negative, considering that she's simply fulfilling peoples' need for gossip, and if not her, someone else will.
Can you clarify what you mean to imply by the distinction between someone deserving death, and someone's death being a positive net-utility shift for everyone?
Certainly. If someone deserves death, that means that it is good for them to die, even if their death does not serve any further purpose. The death penalty is given to those who "deserve" to die.
In order for it to be a positive net utility for someone to die, the consequences of their living simply have to be worse than the consequences of their death. If someone has a stress-induced breakdown and goes on a shooting spree, it is better to kill them than not to kill them (by killing them you are averting more deaths), despite them not "deserving" to die in any meaningful sense.
The idea of someone deserving death in itself is deontological (some people must be punished and that's a rule) while talking about the net utility of whatever is consequentialist. Ethics should be impersonal (that is, treat everyone equally) so a consequentialist ethical system that doesn't approve of death in general should never approve of a death of any single person as an end in itself.
Generally, it seems to me that for a consequentialist, talking about an act or a person being evil should only be computational shortcuts over the real substance of moral reasoning (which consists of assigning utility to world-states). Like in the common example of an airplane that we describe using aerodynamics because that's convenient even though really it runs on the same fundamental laws as everything else. We tend to use those shortcuts reflexively without really thinking what we are trying to say in consequentialist terms.
This.
Of course, the deontological view does have its place, specifically where it precommits to punishing undesirable behaviors even if there is no benefit to doing so after the behavior has occurred.
But would you want to "[punish] undesirable behaviors even if there is no benefit to doing so after the behavior has occurred"?
I would want to pre-commit to punishing criminals after the fact if I thought this would lead to a world where the pos-util of averted crime outweighed the neg-util of punishing people, but not if there were no benefit, and I would be doing this on consequentialist grounds. (I'm basically asking if the deontological view truly "has its place' in this scenario.)
Before the person made the choice of whether or not to do the undesirable behavior, I would want to have precommitted to punishing them if they did the behavior.
In the real world, punishing criminals (probably) does reduce crime. In a world where it didn't, precommitment wouldn't be a useful strategy. But it looks like we live in a world where it does.
Yes. And since we (probably) live in such a world, we can precommit to punishing criminals based on consequentialism. We don't need the deontological view for this.
I disagree with your implication that there is no benefit to punishing undesirable behaviors after they have occurred... there sometimes is.
In cases where there is in fact no benefit, though, then the fact that holding a deontological view precommits me to doing so is not a reason for me to hold that view.
Some disagree. And beware of "should" statements regarding "ethics".
OK, thanks for clarifying.
FWIW, I don't share your model of what it means for someone to deserve death.
Out of curiousity, what is your model?
That the consequences of their living are worse than the consequences of their death.
"Their death" is too abstract, I think. The world might be better is a person died suddenly by accident, but not better if they were killed.
Surely it's no more abstract than "deserve death"? Such a person would deserve to die suddenly by accident, but not deserve to be killed.
Interesting. Does that include the secondary effects of their deaths acting as an example and a deterrent for future undesirable behavior? Because if so, you share my view precisely (that deontology is a useful approximation of consequentialism and allows for more credible precommitment to punishment).
It does include the secondary effects of their deaths acting as a deterrent.
But I don't share your view that deontology allows for more credible precommitment to punishment, except in the somewhat trivial sense that such a precommitment is more credible to observers who consider deontological precommitments more credible than consequentialist ones.
That is, a commitment to punishment based on an adequate understanding of the consequences of punishment is no less likely to lead to punishment than a commitment to punishment based on deontological rules, and therefore a predicter ought to be no less likely to predict punishment from a committed consequentialist than a committed deontologist. Of course, predicters in the real world don't always predict as they ought, so it's possible that a real-world predictor might consider my commitment less credible if it's expressed consequentially.
It's also possible they might consider it more so. Or that they might consider it more credible if I wear a red silk robe when I make it. Or any number of things.
It's valuable to know what factors will make a claim of precommitment credible to my audience (whether I precommit or not), but that doesn't make deontology any more valuable than red robes.
NOTE: As pointed out here, my use of "precommitment" here is potentially misleading. What I'm talking about is an assertion A that I will do X in the future, made in such a way that the existence of A (or, rather, the existence of other things that derive from A having existed in the past, such as memories of A or written records of A or what have you) creates benefits for actually doing X in the future (or, equivalently, costs to not doing so) that can outweigh the costs of doing X (not considering A).
It's really easy to feel a total lack of empathy for fictional characters, especially if they're the sort that nobody likes. I don't actually want to murder hack journalists, but it's pretty funny to do when there's no real human dying.
FTFY
Killing Skeeter is about the only truly questionable action of Quirrellmort that I can remember.
Even here, I find it hard to hold it against Quirrell. Rita made a career of libeling others, blithely unconcerned about the harm she caused to their lives. In fact, she seemed rather smug and self satisfied about exercising that power. Quirrell even confronted her and asked her to stop. She had a chance and chose not to take it. She was destroyed in the act of her preferred crime by the person she intended to harm.
I suppose I have a bit of Quirrell in me. He takes a grim satisfaction in the poetry of citizens being destroyed in the same prisons they demanded be built. The word for that is justice. A harsher justice than I'd want to seen meted out, but justice nevertheless. I wouldn't have squashed Skeeter, but I can't condemn Quirrell for it either.
And yes, Skeeter likely had children who would miss her. Just as good people have some bad, bad people have some good. Recognizing that the world is not black and white shouldn't stop you from seeing that some grays really are darker than others.
I would just like to point out the unintentional irony in that paragraph.
I'm afraid I can't spot it. Could you point it out for me?
Is probably precisely the rational people used when demanding the prisons be built.
Thank you, that makes it very clear.
Was it Quirrell or Voldemort who wiped out the martial arts school?
I don't think we have sufficient evidence to conclude that anyone did. All I witnessed as a reader was Quirrell telling a story that he used to make an ideological point. Why should I believe that story is true?
This is a point I've made elsewhere. What convincing evidence does the reader have of any of the horrific deeds of Voldemort/Quirrell?
The fact that his death is remembered as a national holiday seems pretty convincing evidence that he at least did something naughty.
That evidence is about as convincing as Christmas convinces me Jesus did something good.
However, because the figure Voldemort is not historical but a very recent event practically everyone in the wizarding world affirms to have existed and have been responsible for murders, then we have to choose between the alternative theories that practically the entire wizarding world has been deluding into believing the false story of the Dark Wizard Voldemort or else there was some Dark Wizard Voldemort.
My assessment is that it is more probably Voldemort existed, and was responsible for evil deeds.
If Christmas had been celebrated when Jesus was still a child, instead of being invented to undercut a pagan holiday three centuries later, I would actually regard that as pretty strong evidence.
A national holiday merely indicates that whatever system institutes holidays (in this case the government of magical Britain) has been convinced there is cause for a holiday. I consider this to be rather weak evidence.
For example in the United States the 2nd Thursday in April is "National D.A.R.E. Day" but this doesn't convince me that the D.A.R.E. program does more good than harm. (though it may)
If there were a national holiday celebrating his death and no other evidence I would not have enough information to judge Voldemort's life.
Yes, but it would be sufficient evidence to strongly imply that drugs exist, and that people regard them as bad.
wait, Quirrel killed Rita? Can any of you quote that part for me? I can't believe I skipped this one.
Squished her like a bug.
See Chapter 26:
(The stumbling happened earlier in the same chapter, Quirrell covered it though, feigning dizziness.)
Squished her as a bug.
There's a lot of stuff in the fic that's explained only indirectly, leaving the reader to infer the truth - the Pioneer Plaque horcrux; Malfoy's belief that Harry is Voldemort; that Dumbledore is partially responsible for the potion that cleared up Petunia's appearance; the solution to Rita Skeeter's mistaken evidence (though that was made explicit recently); Skeeter's death; the self-serving nature of Quirrell's "strengthening" of Harry (learning to lose, inability to testify under veritaserum, rescuing a former minion, etc); the list goes on...