You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

Maelin comments on Mental Clarity; or How to Read Reality Accurately - Less Wrong Discussion

-10 Post author: Hicquodiam 12 April 2012 06:18AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (24)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: Maelin 13 April 2012 02:27:35PM *  0 points [-]

I think I was able to understand the first two, but the third one just seems to be asserting (unconvincingly: why should a hearer, if it exists, be able to hear itself?) that we are all p-zombies. I'm pretty damn sure that I, as a conscious, introspective, qualia-having, thinking entity, exist, and that is because I have an awareness of myself, and I do not accept that things that don't exist could have properties such as 'awareness of self'.

I obviously and definitely exist, because nonexistent entities can't do the things that I do.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 13 April 2012 02:42:25PM 1 point [-]

To assert that we are p-zombies was not the intention. You could shoot a p-zombie without causing any suffering, but you will certainly (even under the third theory) cause suffering if you shoot somebody.

Let me try to condense the third one into a few short sentences, and see if that helps convey the underlying intuition better: "Brains implement cognitive algorithms, which upon being run, produce qualia. But these qualia are not observed by any particular person - to the extent that they can be said to be observed in the first place, they 'observe themselves' and then vanish."

To elaborate a little on that: if a qualia was observed by somebody, that implies that that person would experience the qualia of observing a qualia. And since qualias were presumed to be observed by someone, somebody would then have to observe the qualia of observing a qualia of observing a qualia... leading to an infinite regress. The only way (it seems to me) for that regress to bottom out is by positing that qualia aren't observed by anyone - they just are.

Comment author: Maelin 14 April 2012 07:56:43AM 0 points [-]

That makes a bit more sense, but I still disagree. We don't have any problems with infinite regresses elsewhere that require such drastic denials of our own existence. I can think about a thing, and then I can think about thinking about the thing, and then I can think about doing that, and so on. But we don't feel compelled to say "actually the thinking is happening without anything doing it" to rectify this. The infinite regress doesn't seem to cause any problems, and in that case it's an actual infinite regress occurring in my brain, not just a semantic infinite regress occurring in our definitions of 'qualia'.

It seems like the problem can be just as easily solved by saying that the qualia of observing a qualia is the qualia itself. Why should they need to be separate? You experience the sensation of redness, and the experience of experiencing that sensation of redness is precisely the experience of the sensation of redness.

experience[experience[redness]] = experience[redness]

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 14 April 2012 08:20:35AM 0 points [-]

I can think about a thing, and then I can think about thinking about the thing, and then I can think about doing that, and so on.

But that's not an actual infinite regress - you can go up however many levels you like, but it's still a finite number.

It seems like the problem can be just as easily solved by saying that the qualia of observing a qualia is the qualia itself. Why should they need to be separate? You experience the sensation of redness, and the experience of experiencing that sensation of redness is precisely the experience of the sensation of redness.

I'm not sure how your "the qualia of observing a qualia is the qualia itself" is different from my "a qualia observes itself".

Comment author: Maelin 16 April 2012 04:32:27AM 0 points [-]

I'm not sure how your "the qualia of observing a qualia is the qualia itself" is different from my "a qualia observes itself".

The difference, I think, is that there is an observer having the qualia, rather than just a qualia happening by itself without a qualia-haver to have it.

This is starting to feel very nebulous and free-floaty. I feel like the words we are using are not locking on very strongly to robust concepts in my mind. It may not be a productive line of discussion.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 16 April 2012 08:01:05AM *  0 points [-]

This is starting to feel very nebulous and free-floaty. I feel like the words we are using are not locking on very strongly to robust concepts in my mind. It may not be a productive line of discussion.

Agreed - I'm not even sure whether we actually disagree or are just using different terminology.