I think the Ship of Theseus problem is good reductionism practice. Anyone else think similarly?
If I was to use an advanced molecular assembler to create a perfect copy the Mona Lisa and destroy the old one in the process, it would still lose a lot of value. That is because many people not only value the molecular setup of things but also their causal history, what transformations things underwent.
Personally I wouldn't care if I was disassembled and reassembled somewhere else. If that was a safe and efficient way of travel then I would do it. But I would care if that happened to some sort of artifact I value. Not only because it might lose some of its value in the eyes of other people but also because I personally value its causal history to be unaffected by certain transformations.
So in what sense would a perfect copy of the Mona Lisa be the same? In every sense except that it was copied. And if you care about that quality then a perfect copy is not the same, it is merely a perfect copy.
You would care if certain objects are destructively teleported but not care if the same happens to you (and presumably other humans)
Is this a preference you would want to want? I mean, given the ability to self-modify, would you rather keep putting (negative) value on concepts like "copy of" even when there's no practical physical difference? Note that this doesn't mean no longer caring about causal history. (you care about your own casual history in the form of memories and such)
Also, can you trace where this preference is coming from?
If it's worth saying, but not worth its own post (even in Discussion), then it goes here.