So, you and shminux both seem to agree that there exists some X such that X determines observations, and that there exists some Y such that we use Y to constrain our predictions.
You label (X,Y) ("reality","model").
Shminux labels (X,Y) ("repeatably testable model","model").
Is there a situation where one framework makes different predictions than the other?
More generally, is there anything y'all are actually disagreeing about, other than labels?
It sounds like you both agree, for example, that different observers can share an X while having different Ys, as can the same observer at different times, and that different Ys can vary in terms of how closely they approximate X, and that it's best to adopt the most reliably X-approximating Ys I can.
What don't you agree on?
I admit I find shminux's labeling a little bizarre, as it leads me to say things like "the behavior of a Neandrathal hunter who falls off a cliff is constrained by a repeatably testable model", but pretty much whatever labels I use I will end up saying some bizarre things about how the world really works, so that doesn't bug me too much.
EDIT: Based on discussions below, I revise my understanding of the Xs and Ys to:
(X,Y)minibearrex ("reality","set of models").
(X,Y)shminux ("set of repeatably testable models","set of models").
So, you and shminux both seem to agree that there exists some X such that X determines observations, and that there exists some Y such that we use Y to constrain our predictions.
That is not quite the model of natural science I have in my mind. Yes, experimental testing is used to check models' validity, but I never said that the results of this testing are determined by a single coherent whole 'X'. The model of having such an 'X' works well in classical physics, including the unfortunate dude from the Simple Truth. It does not work well in QM. Specific...
Today's post, When Science Can't Help was originally published on 15 May 2008. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
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