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thomblake comments on The ethics of breaking belief - Less Wrong Discussion
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Comments (125)
The "Dark Arts-ish levers" are what make this situation interesting. If it were merely a matter of telling the truth, virtually every ethical theory would come out in favor of telling the truth. But having access to such levers is "Here, let me make this choice for you" and that puts you in murky ethical territory.
Some conditional answers from various points of view:
If pulling the lever makes the world rank higher according to your preferences, then pull it.
If both you and they would be better off if you pulled the lever, then pull it.
If your relationship with them properly entails your pulling of the lever, then break off the relationship or pull the lever.
If pulling the levers intersects with duties such that you should pull them, then pull them. If it intersects with duties such that you should not pull them, then don't pull them.
If all of the above criteria come out in the same direction, then you have a pretty definitive answer.
I trust that this answer is not below-average in terms of helpfulness of ethical advice.
Please describe a situation where one definitely and unambiguously should not "pull the lever".
If the lever, aside from being a metaphorical lever, is also attached to a very large nuclear explosive.
If afterwards, the person will feel manipulated and violated, and become angry, and break off the friendship, (even if they stay atheist), pulling the lever would be a bad choice.
I would not call it unambiguous. They might come around after awhile and thank you.
Even if it were just a matter of telling the truth, I don't think it would be ethically unambiguous. The more general question is whether the value of increasing some person's net-true-beliefs stat outweighs the corresponding decrease in that person's ability-to-fit-comfortably-in-theist-society stat. In other words I am questioning WHETHER they would be better off, not which conditional I should thereafter follow.
Yes, if all you care about is whether they would be better off, then it's merely an empirical question.
Normally that's the end of the conversation for a philosopher, but I shall go on. Based on nothing, I'd say they'd be better off. They should just find a new atheist society. With blackjack and hookers.
Not quite the advice I was hoping for, but thank you for your honesty.