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Furcas comments on Neuroimaging as alternative/supplement to cryonics? - Less Wrong Discussion

17 Post author: Wei_Dai 12 May 2012 11:26PM

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Comment author: Furcas 13 May 2012 05:20:13AM *  4 points [-]

It's also not clear that one could tell whether it failed.

If the superintelligence does the same kind of coarse-grained scan to living humans and successfully copies/recreates them from that information alone, there would every reason to think the process would work just as well with dead humans like you, right?

Then again, it's not clear to me that I ought to care about the difference.

Well, if you care about living, rather than about somebody similar to you that wrongly believes to be you, you definitely should care about the difference.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 13 May 2012 02:14:32PM 1 point [-]

I care about living (usually), but it's not clear to me that what I care about when I care about living is absent in the "failed" scenario.

As far as I can tell, "being me" just isn't all that precisely defined in the first place; it describes a wide range of possible conditions. Which seems to allow for the possibility of two entities A and B existing at some future time such that A and B are different, but both A and B satisfy the condition of being me.

I agree, though, that if A is the result of my body traveling through time in the conventional manner, and B is the result of some other process, and A and B are different, it is conventional to say that A is really me and B is not. It's just that this strikes me as a socially constructed truth more than an empirically observed one.

I also agree that the test you describe is compelling evidence that the copy/recreation process is as reliable a self-preserver as anything could be.