that consciousness doesn't work because it's made of quarks and leptons, but you can make a consciousness using nothing but quarks and leptons, and the consciousness won't be a result of anything else entering in on some other level.

This is quite true, but accidental and so irrelevant. Indeed, the intermediate levels between consciousness and quarks can vary wildly: it can be built on neurons or, potentially, on silicon gates. Worse yet, if you get a sandboxed emulated mind, the lowest level they have access to is whatever the host system decides to provide. Such a sandboxed EY would argue that everything is reducible to the API calls, which are the fundamental building blocks of matter.

EY says:

So is the 747 made of something other than quarks? No, you're just modeling it with representational elements that do not have a one-to-one correspondence with the quarks of the 747. The map is not the territory.

To me it is an irrelevant accident that physical objects, unlike informational objects, happen to be reducible to quarks. After all, if you accept the possibility that we live in a simulation, I see no reason other than laziness to use the same substrate for different entities. But I agree that the best examples come from "computationalism": the same FAT file system can be implemented in multiple ways, some reducible to magnetic domains on a floppy disk, others only to the API calls from a sandboxed virtual machine.