CarlShulman comments on Resurrection through simulation: questions of feasibility, desirability and some implications - Less Wrong Discussion
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (57)
If you combine this with a Big World (e.g. eternal inflation) where all minds get instantiated then nothing matters. But you would still care about what happens even if you believed this is a Big World.
Why shouldn't we be open to the possibility that a Big World renders all attempts at consequentially altruistic behavior meaningless?
Even if I'm wrong that single instantiation is all that matters it seems plausible that what we should be concerned with is not the frequency with which happy minds are instantiated but the proportion of "futures" it which suffering has been relieved.