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Armok_GoB comments on This post is for sacrificing my credibility! - Less Wrong Discussion

-29 Post author: Will_Newsome 02 June 2012 12:08AM

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Comment author: Armok_GoB 03 June 2012 02:57:51AM 4 points [-]

Actually, it does wrong on a much deeper and earlier level than that, and also you don't grok UDT as well as you think you do, or you wouldn't have considered the lottery question worth even considering.

Comment author: Will_Newsome 03 June 2012 03:10:25AM *  0 points [-]

More precisely, though, I thought the subject was worth your consideration, because I hadn't seen you in decision theory discussion. (Sorry, I don't mean to be or come across as defensive here. I'm a little surprised your model of me doesn't predict me asking those as trick questions. But only a little.)

Re deeper problems, there are metaphysical problems that are deeper and should be obvious, but the tack I wanted to take was purely epistemological, such that there's less wiggle room. Many people reject UDT because "values shouldn't affect anticipation", and I think I can neatly argue against anthropics without hitting up against that objection. Which would be necessary to convince the philosophers, I think.

Comment author: Nighzmarquls 03 June 2012 03:14:26AM 1 point [-]

Compensating over duplicitous behavior in models can tend to clog up simulations and lead to processing halting.

I generally would take all statements as reflective of exactly what some one means if at all possible.

Its also great fun to short circuit sarcasm in a similar way.