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shminux comments on Malthusian copying: mass death of unhappy life-loving uploads - Less Wrong Discussion
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Given the general non-existence of qualia, this is perfectly reasonable.
More details: qualia is the way things seem and feel from the inside, though unobservable from the outside. P-zombie is an accusation of someone lacking qualia, which can never be refuted, given that qualia is unobservable. Who but a p-zombie would make such an accusation?
I am also deeply suspiscious of this qualia thing, but you can't use arguments about qualia as evidence of p-zombie. (because pzombie and "conscious being" are supposed to be observably equivalent)
My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm, given that the RolfAndreassen's argument
has no testable predictions. Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.
I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.
Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?
The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.