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nyan_sandwich comments on Malthusian copying: mass death of unhappy life-loving uploads - Less Wrong Discussion

12 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 02 July 2012 04:37PM

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Comment author: shminux 05 July 2012 05:30:08AM *  0 points [-]

My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm, given that the RolfAndreassen's argument

The assumption is that the bits are conscious and experience qualia.

has no testable predictions. Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.

Comment author: [deleted] 05 July 2012 05:39:42AM 0 points [-]

My original comment was intended as a (apparently failed) sarcasm

I got that it was sarcastic. I was sortof sarcastically picking at your sarcasm-logic.

Qualia is no better concept than a p-zombie.

Yes I know. What would the non-qualia case even feel like? What does it even mean for red to have a redness to it, besides the fact that it is distinguishable from green and connected to a bunch of other concepts?

Comment author: TheOtherDave 05 July 2012 06:05:14AM 1 point [-]

The closest analog I have for this is how it felt to not feel like I had free will, which I discuss here. I imagine not feeling like I have qualia would be a similar experience of not having my sense of personal identity engaged with my sense of perceiving red.