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TimS comments on Less Wrong views on morality? - Less Wrong Discussion
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People here seem to share anti-realist sensibilities but then balk at the label and do weird things for anti-realists like treat moral judgments as beliefs, make is-ought mistakes, argue against non-consequentialism as if there were a fact of the matter, and expect morality to be describable in terms of a coherent and consistent set of rules instead of an ugly mess of evolved heuristics.
I'm not saying it can never be reasonable for an anti-realist to do any of those things, but it certainly seems like belief in subjective or non-cognitive morality hasn't filtered all the way through people's beliefs.
I attribute this behavior in part to the desire to preserve the possibility of universal provably Friendly AI. I don't think a moral anti-realist is likely to think an AGI can be friendly to me and to Aristotle. It might not even be possible to be friendly to me and any other person.
Well that seems like the most dangerous instance of motivated cognition ever.
It seems like an issue that's important to get right. Is there a test we could run to see whether it's true?
Yes, but only once. ;)
Did you mean to link to this comment?
Thanks, fixed.