I think we are simply having a definitional dispute. As the term is used generally, moral realism doesn't mean that each agent has a morality, but that there are facts about morality that are external to the agent (i.e. objective). Now, "objective" is not identical to "universal," but in practice, objective facts tend to cause convergence of beliefs. So I think what I am calling "moral realism" is something like what you are calling "Friendliness realism."
Lengthening the inferential distance further is that realism is a two place word. As you noted, there is a distinction between realism(Friendliness, agents) and realism(Friendliness, humans).
That said, I do think that "people would perceive an AI implementing objective morals as Friendly" if I believed that objective morals exist. I'm not sure why you think that's a stronger claim than "people who are sufficiently educated and exposed to the right knowledge will come to agree with certain universal objective morals." If you believed that there were objective moral facts and knew the content of those facts, wouldn't you try to adjust your beliefs and actions to conform to those facts, in the same way that you would adjust your physical-world beliefs to conform to objective physical facts?
I think we are simply having a definitional dispute.
That seems likely. If moral realists think the morality is a one-place word, and anti realists think it's a two place word, we would be better served by using two distinct words.
It is somewhat unclear to me what moral realists are thinking of, or claiming, about whatever it is they call morality. (Even after taking into account that different people identified as moral realists do not all agree on the subject.)
...So I think what I am calling "moral realism" is something like what you are call
From the last thread:
Meta: