(2) The brain is only needed for physical expressions of mentality ("talking", etc.), and we revert to purely non-physical mental functioning in the afterlife.
These are silly views, of course, but I'm not yet convinced that the existence of brain damage makes them any more so than they were to begin with.
It seems the considerations in gjm's comment actively tear (2) to shreds.
No plot spoilers here, just wanted to flag a bit of poor reasoning that shows up in Chapter 39:
This is a surprisingly common fallacy. Just because X depends on Y, it doesn't follow that X depends on nothing but Y. A phenomenon may involve more than just its most obvious failure point.
To illustrate: Suppose I'm trapped in a box, and my only way to communicate with the outside world is via radio communication. Someone on the other end argues that I don't really exist -- "There's no person beyond the radio receiver, for if there was then there wouldn't be any such thing as damaged radios!" Pretty silly, huh? But people say this kind of thing in defense of physicalism all the time.
(N.B. This is not to defend the existence of souls. It's just to point out that this particular argument against them is invalid.)