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Nisan comments on The Mere Cable Channel Addition Paradox - Less Wrong Discussion

64 Post author: Ghatanathoah 26 July 2012 07:20AM

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Comment author: [deleted] 26 July 2012 04:32:39PM 3 points [-]

What's the difference between "On a purely selfish basis, is it better for me, personally, to exist or not to exist?" and "Would I commit suicide, all other things being equal?"?

Comment author: Nisan 27 July 2012 10:12:24PM *  0 points [-]

You can tell whether a timeless decision agent would prefer to have been born by giving it opportunities to make decisions that acausally increase its probability of being born.

EDIT: For example, you can convince the agent that it was created because its creator believed that the agent would probably make paperclips. If the TDT agent values its existence, it will make paperclips.

I don't think a causal decision agent has anything that can be called a "preference to have been born".