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TheOtherDave comments on [SEQ RERUN] The Bedrock of Morality: Arbitrary? - Less Wrong Discussion

2 Post author: MinibearRex 31 July 2012 03:45AM

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Comment author: TheOtherDave 01 August 2012 01:26:47PM 0 points [-]

I'm >.9 confident that EY would agree that with you that, supposing we do inherently value well-being and cooperation, we would not if we had not evolved to do so.
I'm >.8 confident that EY would also say that valuing well-being and cooperation (in addition to other things, some of which might be more important) is right, or perhaps right, and not just "h-right".

For my own part, I think "inherently" is a problematic word here. A sufficiently sophisticated paperclip maximizer would agree that cooperation is a Good Move, in that it can be used to increase the rate of paperclip production. I agree that cooperation is a Good Move in roughly the same way.

Comment author: endoself 02 August 2012 04:53:46AM 0 points [-]

I agree that EY would say both those things. I did not mean to contradict either in my comment.

A sufficiently sophisticated paperclip maximizer would agree that cooperation is a Good Move, in that it can be used to increase the rate of paperclip production. I agree that cooperation is a Good Move in roughly the same way.

That is part of what I was trying to convey with the word 'inherently'. The other part is that I think EY would say that humans do value some forms of cooperation, such as friendship, inherently, in addition to their instrumental value. I am, however, a bit less confident of that than of the things I have said about EY's metaethical views.

Comment author: Decius 02 August 2012 08:17:30PM 0 points [-]

Most variants of h-morality inherently value those things. Many other moralities also value those things. That does not make them objectively better than their absence. Note that the presence of values in a specified morality is a factual question, not a moral one.

Whether or not h-morality h-should value cooperation and friendship inherently is a null question. H-moralities h-should be whatever they are, by definition. Whether or not h-morality o-should do so is a question that requires understanding o-morality to answer.