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ScottL comments on Making My Peace with Belief - Less Wrong Discussion

14 Post author: OrphanWilde 03 December 2015 08:36PM

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Comment author: Lumifer 03 December 2015 09:22:52PM 5 points [-]

beliefs may be epistemically irrational while being instrumentally rational.

I predict pushback -- LW won't like that idea one little bit :-)

and just accept the notion that there may be something interesting going on underneath the surface.

That's not the definition of "rational", though.

You're basically saying that with "irrational" beliefs one should go meta -- look at them from the outside, consider actual consequences and effects, ponder why these beliefs exists... Yeah, sure. Going "Oh, you believe in <deity>, you must be so dumb" is dumb. And yes, "I don't know why this works, but this works" is a reasonable :-) position to take.

I'm still not sure, though, that by the prediction metric science will look as badly as you hint and religions will shine. Contemporary religions generally shy away from testable (during the lifetime) predictions and for good reasons, too. As to science, I think the distinction between hard and soft sciences is pretty necessary here. Hard sciences live and die by predictions. Soft sciences spin narratives -- just like your friendly pastor next door :-/

Comment author: ScottL 04 December 2015 05:13:35AM *  1 point [-]

I predict pushback -- LW won't like that idea one little bit :-)

That claim seems totally fine to me. Inaccurate maps can still be useful, sometimes even more useful than more accurate maps as they can be simpler to use and easier to create. I wrote about that here.

Incorrect maps can also sometimes be useful. Examples of this are adaptive biases like the sexual over perception bias in men. From a truth-maximization perspective young men who assume that all women want them are showing severe social-cognitive inaccuracies, judgment biases, and probably narcissistic personality disorder. However, from an evolutionary perspective, the same young men are behaving in a more optimal manner. One which has consistently maximized the reproductive success of their male ancestors. Another similar example is the bias for positive perception of partners.