You're looking at Less Wrong's discussion board. This includes all posts, including those that haven't been promoted to the front page yet. For more information, see About Less Wrong.

DanielLC comments on Utility functions and quantum mechanics - Less Wrong Discussion

6 Post author: Manfred 31 August 2012 03:41AM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (20)

You are viewing a single comment's thread.

Comment author: DanielLC 31 August 2012 04:06:13AM 2 points [-]

With an inherently probabilistic interpretation of QM, flipping a quantum coin has to be treated linearly by our rational agent

Why? I understand that the people here tend to think that's a good idea, but it doesn't allow for Dutch book betting like violating Bayes' Theorem does.

And all coins, when you get down to it, are quantum.

Not exactly. If we were to make a bet on the millionth digit of pi, or the accuracy of string theory, or whether or not there is a particle with a mass in a certain range, the result would be the same in every Everett branch.

Comment author: Manfred 31 August 2012 04:53:05AM 0 points [-]

Why?

The thing I am asserting without bothering to back it up is called the expected utility hypothesis.

millionth digit of pi

Fair enough. I believe you get the point though.

Comment author: DanielLC 31 August 2012 05:21:01AM 0 points [-]

The thing I am asserting without bothering to back it up is called the expected utility hypothesis.

It's equivalent to having different priors and doing it linearly (although you might have to involve infinitesimal probabilities to get it to work exactly right). That does raise the question of whether those things really can be considered separate.

Comment author: faul_sname 31 August 2012 04:22:37AM *  0 points [-]

Yes, though the result of the bet (i.e. your observations) would be different in an infinitesimal fraction of them.

/useless nitpick that doesn't actually change your point