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Vaniver comments on Utility functions and quantum mechanics - Less Wrong Discussion

6 Post author: Manfred 31 August 2012 03:41AM

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Comment author: Vaniver 31 August 2012 06:49:51PM 2 points [-]

And all coins, when you get down to it, are quantum. At the extreme, this leads to the possible rationality of quantum suicide - since you're alive in the quantum state somewhere, just claim that your utility function non-linearly focuses on the part where you're alive.

So? In such a case, regular suicide would also be rational. (That is, instead of surviving all of the time with utility 1, you would prefer to survive p of the time with utility U>1/p.)

Comment author: Manfred 31 August 2012 09:48:17PM *  0 points [-]

The standard formulation is that you would only prefer to commit quantum suicide if, if you happen to survive, you'll be better off by some standard. Overdosing but waking up in the hospital doesn't count, but gambling your life in interesting ways does.

Comment author: Vaniver 31 August 2012 10:46:11PM 1 point [-]

The reason quantum suicide is attractive when regular suicide isn't is because MWI gives but there's still a chance extra emotional weight.

The "only states in which I'm alive matter" utility function will tell you to play Russian Roulette at any odds, so long as the payoff is positive, regardless of whether you believe MWI or not.

And even if you call death utility 0, then it can still be rational to play Russian Roulette, so long as the payoff in utilons is high enough to justify the chance of 0 utility, again whether you believe MWI or not.