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Vladimir_Nesov comments on Group rationality diary, 8/6/12 - Less Wrong Discussion
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For what purpose? Decision-theoretically, what matters is consequences, not experiences.
I can imagine purposes for which envisioning multiple different hypotheticals is useful for decision-making, so I will concede this point. My original opinion was simply that I have different criteria for what makes me sleep better at night than I thought I did, anyway.
I'm confused by this distinction. Can you give me an example of an experience that is not a consequence and therefore doesn't matter decision-theoretically? Can you give me an example of a consequence that is not an experience and therefore matters decision-theoretically?
For example, if you make a decision and then die, there will be consequences, but no future experiences. While future experiences are part of consequences, they don't paint a balanced picture, as (predictable) things outside experiences are going to happen as well. You can send $X to charity, and expected consequences will predictably depend on specific (moderate) value of X, but you won't expect differing future experiences depending on X.
Gotcha! Sure, that makes sense. Thanks.