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novalis comments on Friendly AI and the limits of computational epistemology - Less Wrong Discussion

18 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 08 August 2012 01:16PM

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Comment author: novalis 08 August 2012 06:29:58PM 5 points [-]

Maybe I missed this, but did you ever write up the Monday/Tuesday game with your views on consciousness? On Monday, consciousness is an algorithm running on a brain, and when people say they have consciously experienced something, they are reporting the output of this algorithm. On Tuesday, the true ontology of mind resembles the ontology of transcendental phenomenology. What's different?

I'm also confused about why an algorithm couldn't represent a mass of entangled electrons.

Comment author: novalis 08 August 2012 06:35:57PM 1 point [-]

Oh, also: imagine that SIAI makes an AI. Why should they make it conscious at all? They're just trying to create an intelligence, not a consciousness. Surely, even if consciousness requires whatever it is you think it requires, an intelligence does not.

Comment author: David_Gerard 08 August 2012 11:33:07PM *  0 points [-]

Indeed. Is my cat conscious? It's certainly an agent (it appears to have its own drives and motivations), with considerable intelligence (for a cat) and something I'd call creativity (it's an ex-stray with a remarkable ability to work out how to get into places with food it's after).

Comment author: David_Gerard 13 August 2012 07:26:20PM 2 points [-]

And the answer appears to be: yes. “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Nonhuman animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”