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RichardKennaway comments on Friendly AI and the limits of computational epistemology - Less Wrong Discussion

18 Post author: Mitchell_Porter 08 August 2012 01:16PM

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Comment author: RichardKennaway 15 August 2012 12:39:36PM 1 point [-]

Therefore I deduce that the properties defining the physical correlate of a state of consciousness, are not fuzzy ones like "number of neurons firing in a particular ganglion", but are instead properties that are microphysically exact.

My subjective conscious experience seems no more exact a thing to me than my experience of distinctions of colours. States of consciousness seem to be a continuous space, and there isn't even a hard boundary (again, as I perceive things subjectively) between what is conscious and what is not.

But perhaps people vary in this; perhaps it is different for you?