I think there's a pretty substantial leap from "Animals experience moods" (a claim which wouldn't invoke too much controversy) to "Animals experience consciousness" (a claim which would).
Granted, there are definitions of consciousness which are satisfied by the possession of mood, I doubt those definitions are what the authors had in mind when they made this claim, even if those are the definitions they used; such a claim stinks of sneaking in connotation.
Mood and agency. I think you'd have a hard time claiming that no non-human could be reasonably described as an agent that works toward goals.
(I think of my cat, a smart and scrappy ex-stray, and how he and the kitten worked out how to get into the fridge: old cat lies down, young cat stands on him and pulls door open. Note that the older cat thoroughly disliked the kitten even as he conceded they were in the same pack. We saw them do the fridge trick and were flabbergasted. We put a lock on the fridge to keep out the cats, not the kid.)
But yeah, argument about this does descend into definition wrangling.
The Francis Crick Memorial Conference, held in Cambridge last month, has come up with the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (PDF).
tl;dr humans still aren't special, consciousness seems to arise in quite a variety of nervous systems and working out what it is is a problem in neurology.
We declare the following: “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from
experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with
the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that
humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-
human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also
possess these neurological substrates.”