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RolfAndreassen comments on Idle speculation about anchoring and the Facebook IPO - Less Wrong Discussion
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Ok, now I see what you're saying. However, it seems to me that every pre-IPO shareholder in every company has an incentive, from this argument, to push for a higher IPO price, while the bankers have an incentive to hold the price down. So what made Facebook unusual?
That aside, your point remains good for showing that my speculation is probably off, even though it doesn't in itself explain Facebook's trajectory.
I-Banker incentives are complicated. On the one hand, potential clients select among them based on their ability to generate wealth for the client (pushing IPO prices up). On the other hand, they have tremendous opportunity for self-dealing transactions (pushing the IPO price down). The balance is apparently in flux.
Facebook may have been unusual because Zuckerberg's particular special skills seem to resolve around analyzing and monetizing social interactions. Those skills may have helped him maneuver the I-bankers better than the average going-public entrepreneur.
In a couple years we'll know whether the Facebook IPO was a trend or a blip in the pattern of IPOs. Blip supports the Zuckerberg-IPO-insights theory, while a larger trend suggests the opposite.