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Comments (627)
Externalism: The representational content of our mental states (e.g. what objects our beliefs are about) is dependent upon properties of our external environment, not just upon properties of our brain state.
Internalism: The representational content of our mental states is fixed by our brain state.
This looks like an unheard falling tree problem, the problematic term being "the representational content of our mental states".
Voted other for essentially this reason.
Agreed with Richard above, it's hard to know what to do with "the representational content of our mental states". How would I know if the representational content of one of my mental states had changed? What would I expect to observe differently?
That said, I voted "internalism", roughly on the grounds that while I can posit things that might deserve the label "an aspect of the representational content of a mental state that depends on properties of my external environment," I don't actually seem to care about any of them.
If you take Dennett's intentional stance towards our mental states, I think you can only do so by considering the external environment that the brain is operating in. Which I guess makes me an externalist (which is what I answered), but I'm not sure whether that's the traditional definition.
Also voted for "externalism" for the same reason.
I wrote a book on Dennett, read the vast majority of what he wrote, and agree with both of you on the Intentional Stance --> Externalism.
If that is worth something.
Dennett's notional worlds are not externalist, but not contain properties philosophy usually ascribes the category of mental states, such as beliefs.
"Beyond Belief" for more on Dennett on that.
Other: What? I'm not understanding the question.
Does this help?
Yes. I presume they haven't had time to notice they're in different physical environments (as they will diverge in a matter of milliseconds as they see different things and different neurons fire).
I voted "Lean toward: externalism", but the I get the feeling that even asking the question shows that you're barking up the wrong tree.
Voted "other" for this reason. Seems like a wrong question.
Other: What? The brain state simply is. You can give it meaning, but meaning is a two place function. I'm probably confused.
Think of it this way. There are two people, A and B, who are exact physical duplicates of one another. They are, however, embedded in different environments. If you think that A and B must necessarily have all the same beliefs, you are an internalist. If you think their beliefs can be different, you are an externalist.
They are the same, they pretty clearly have the same beliefs. I infer from the disagreement that this is about "knowledge" (which is a lot more confused than belief). With knowledge, it depends how you define it (does it have to be true?). Other.
No, it is not about knowledge, it's about belief (or any other representational state). An externalist believes that the content of a belief -- what a belief is about -- is determined by causal entanglements with the environment. I have beliefs about Eliezer Yudkowsky because my brain states are causally entangled with Eliezer Yudkowsky. These beliefs need not qualify as knowledge. Say a physical duplicate of me appeared on Mars by a random thermal fluctuation. Even though that duplicate has the same brain state as I do, his brain state is not causally entangled with Eliezer, so the externalist would say that he does not have beliefs about Eliezer. If you think this is obviously false, you are most likely an internalist.
keyword "about".
Other: While the only things I can directly experience are my brain states, my senses allow me to have indirect content regarding my external environment. While every belief I have regarding external objects is about some brain state, I only have the representational content because it is important for me to match my mental state to the external-world. There is a relationship between the external-world state and the mental representation that cannot be ignored.
Other: embodied cognition (externalism but moreso).