Hm, not sure. Obviously on the object level you can just prove what the UDT agent will do. But not being able to do that is presumably why you're uncertain in the first place.
Still, I think people should usually just trust themselves. "I don't think I'm a rock, and a rock doesn't think it's a rock, but that doesn't mean I might be a rock."
I tried to solve it on my own, but haven't been able to so far. I haven't been able to figure out what sort of function someone who knows that I'm using UDT will use to predict my actions, and how my own decisions affect that. If someone knows that I'm using UDT, and I think that they think that I will cooperate with anyone who knows I'm using UDT, then I should break my word. But if they know that...
In general, I'm rather suspicious of the "trust yourself" argument. The Lake Wobegon effect would seem to indicate that humans don't do it well.
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